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ABSTRACT 
 
There is little empirical research identifying the structural forces influencing the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The purpose of this study was to 
analyze the structural forces underlying international accounting regulation to contribute 
insights useable by the public, politicians, and scholars to conceptualize the processes of 
international accounting regulation. Based on stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and 
social network theory it was posited that this network is rationally created to serve certain 
stakeholder groups in the face of divergent stakeholder interests. The research questions 
for this study addressed the organizations which constituted the IASB’s governance 
network, the professional and geographic perspectives represented, and the extent to 
which the governance network was structurally embedded. Social network methodology 
was utilized within a case study design. All data consisted of publically available existing 
data. Social network analysis including graphic notations, density, comembership 
overlap, and co-organizational overlap were employed to produce a representation of the 
governance network and to measure the extent to which the network was structurally 
embedded. To provide supplementary detail, the professional perspectives and 
geographic representations of the actors were measured. The results indicated that the 
network forms a definable hierarchy that exhibits qualities of structural embeddedness. 
Banking interests were more embedded within the governance network than any other 
professional, academic, or social group. Also, a strong Western influence was detected. 
The societal benefit of this effort was to engage society in general and accounting 
researchers in particular in hopes of encouraging diverse representation in regulatory 
processes with both macro and micro-consequences. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
Introduction 
Mainstream accounting theory holds that accounting is neutral or more 
appropriately a functional craft that should be, and currently is, well removed from its 
societal potentialities (Roslender, 2006). This is problematical given that the U.S. 
financial crisis of September 2008 was in large part predicated, and conceivably revealed, 
by seemly neutral accounting regulations. For example, accounting jargon, such as the 
mark-to-market rule, is finding commonplace in the media coverage of the financial crisis 
(Gannon, 2009). Calling into question a few accounting regulations is a veil for much 
larger regulatory issues within a fallible economic system (Mark-to-market accounting, 
2009; United States Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.). Whether these issues 
will be identified in the mainstream or not remains to be seen. One thing; however, is 
marked, the accounting regulations underlying financial markets and economic policies 
do affect society (Carson, King, & Lewis, 2008).  
In a majority of mainstream discourse on accounting convergence positive 
potentiality is taken for granted rather than empirically investigated (Nicolaisen, 2005; 
Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). The goal of accounting convergence, or adopting a single 
set of internationally accepted financial accounting standards, is to promote global 
economic interconnectiveness by creating an unparalleled liquidity of international 
capital markets (Nicolaisen, 2005). At face value accounting standards govern the 
method(s) in which economic data are recorded and subsequently reported in the 
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financial statements of issuing entities (Weygandt, Kieso, & Kimmel, 2008). These 
standards range from the classification of transactions to the monetary amount to be 
recognized in order to properly capture the economic substance of the transaction(s) in 
question. Though technical, accounting standards create incentives or disincentives, 
depending on the application, for organizations to conduct certain types of business, in 
certain areas and with certain stakeholders (Perry & Nolke, 2006). For example, 
according to James (2008) a recent accounting regulation requires companies to increase 
the expense as well as the related liability associated with company funded pension plans 
and other post retirement benefit plans, such as health care. This regulation not only 
adversely impacts the financial statements but it also diminishes a company’s willingness 
to offer such plans. As a result employee stakeholders are less likely to benefit from the 
security inherent of defined benefit retirement plans (James, 2008). Given the proven 
market volatilities of personal retirement investment accounts, such as 401K investments, 
the potentiality of this accounting disincentive alone is staggering. Yet this is only one 
example of how the process of setting accounting standards shapes economic transactions 
which in turn directly affect societies (Cooper, Neu, & Lehman, 2003; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a, 2005b). 
The processes of global accounting regulation are encapsulated in the work of 
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Steward (2005). Global regulation functions in a space they deem 
global administrative law. In particular, they noted that, “emerging patterns of global 
governance are being shaped by a little-noticed but important and growing body of global 
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administrative law” (p. 15). International accounting regulations fostered by the 
accounting convergence movement is one of the more significant happenings in global 
administrative law. To date; however, the arena of global administrative law, in general, 
and accounting convergence, in particular, is uninformed about the scope, structure, and 
impact of these global administrators (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 
2005b).  
This study examined the structural elements of the International Accounting 
Standards Board’s (IASB) governance network. Although the prospect of global 
accounting governance may seem well removed from the traditional arrangement of 
national accounting regulation, the proliferation of international reporting standards has 
profound effects on national as well as global economies (Cooper & Robson, 2006; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2004; Graham & Neu, 2003; Schmidt, 2002). As pointed out by 
Cooper and Robson (2006) it is hardly possible to study international accounting 
regulation seriously without considering the complex web of alliances, agreements, and 
accords that exist between these organizations. This governance network is understudied. 
Problem Statement 
At present there is little available empirical research identifying the structural 
forces influencing the IASB. Although researchers such as Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 
2005b) and Brown (2004) have attempted to address this disparity, no attempts have been 
made in mainstream accounting literature to holistically examine the IASB’s governance 
network even though the need for such efforts has been expressed for at least a decade 
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(Hopwood, 1994; Laughlin, 1999). That the IASB’s governance network has yet to 
receive significant scholarly attention even in light of such troublesome concerns is, to be 
sure, the problem. 
 Specifically it is questioned why proven theoretical and methodological tools such 
as social network analysis have not been applied to explore the milieu of the IASB 
(Laughlin, 1995). In particular scholarly inquiries of this type can identify the 
organizations that constitute the IASB’s governance network and measure the extent to 
which individual actors are structurally embedded within the network (Jones et al., 1997; 
Rowley, 1997). Additional mathematical analysis can add further conceptual detail to the 
governance network by measuring the professional perspectives and geographic 
representation of the individual actors.  
Much literature is cautiously silent or expressly limited as to the specific interests 
and influences of the organizations within the IASB’s governance network (Nicolaisen, 
2005; Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). Nevertheless the compelling findings uncovered by 
a minority of contemporary, even critical, scholars elicit suspicions, perhaps to a lesser 
degree curiosity, about the inner workings of the IASB (Brown, 2004; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2005; Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a). If the adoption of international 
accounting standards is accepted as an economically, politically, and socially important 
phenomenon, then the standard setting process demands empirical scrutiny. 
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Given the recent financial crisis in the U.S. a critical examination of the 
organizational stakeholder’s interest in, possibly even influence over, the accounting 
regulators is of urgent relevance. Consequently the strict fundamentalist view of neutral 
accounting is rejected; perhaps even toxic in its own right (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2005; 
Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a). It is evident that accounting requirements can be used 
to serve the public’s interest by issuing certain guidance, or to serve particular interests 
by issuing contrary guidance. The judgment of what constitutes fair and equable 
valuations is far from straightforward (Perry & Nolke, 2006). As a result stakeholder 
influence within the regulatory body can convey broad power and even greater 
consequences (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Schmidt, 2002). 
Assuming a broader scope to address these stakeholder interests Hopwood (1994), 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2006), and Lehman (2005b) noted the menacing influence of 
nongovernmental global institutions; although none go as far as creating a holistic 
network per se. Gallhofer and Haslam (2006) wrote, “there is much that is reflective in 
accounting phenomena of the very unfair and highly problematic global context…and 
accounting is constitutive of the problematics of its context too” (p. 919). Laughlin 
(1999) echoed this position by questioning critical accounting researchers for neglecting, 
“accounting-related thinking in regulatory process” (Societal dimensions section, para. 
4). Therefore, considering the rate at which international accounting regulations are 
replacing national regulations, there is an imperative need for scholars to define and 
explore the IASB’s governance network. 
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Background of Problem 
In an effort to facilitate cross-border trading and financial statement comparability 
throughout the world the IASB has been charged with furthering the movement toward 
one international set of accounting standards (Ruder et al., 2005). The movement toward 
a single set of international financial reporting standards is known as accounting 
convergence or formerly accounting harmonization. This rapid escalation of economic 
globalization, otherwise a race for financial return, has necessitated a desire by many 
actors for internationally comparable financial data. As a result accounting convergence 
has gained mainstream support as it supplies the processes necessary to achieve a unified 
capital market (Nicolaisen, 2005). 
The business of financial accounting is viewed as a, if not the, major impediment 
to the raging whirlwind of economic globalization. Capital markets must minimize 
investor risks, maximize investor returns, and produce comparable financial information 
for decision-based investing (Herz & Petrone, 2005; Nicolaisen, 2005; Tweedie & 
Seidenstein, 2005). An efficient global capital market must be interpreted by comparable 
accounting or regulatory standards (Cooper et al., 2003; Graham & Neu, 2003). Over the 
last decade organizations such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), national 
governments, and the World Bank have labored to achieve a single set of international 
accounting standards (Herz & Petrone, 2005; Nicolaisen, 2005). This labor of interested 
actors has been realized. Accounting convergence is a global reality (IASB, 2008a). 
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Whereas the reality of accounting convergence cannot be questioned, whether its 
forging was precipitated by actual users of financial accounting information is 
problematic. It appears that the ordinary users of accounting data, “…tend to be 
represented rhetorically rather than physically” (Hopwood, 1994, p. 243) by financial 
accounting proponents and regulators. Hopwood (1994) detailed a lack of empirical 
analysis on the international demand for accounting convergence. Further he questioned 
the undemocratic trends toward privatization and standardization based on the western-
centric philosophies of capital market effectiveness and efficiency. In this light Hopwood 
urged contemporary researchers to consider the cosmopolitan effects of international 
accounting, the ambiguity and complexity of the powers behind this influential 
movement, and how such powers pervade society. 
An optimistic vantage of unrestricted capital flows is echoed in the majority of 
prevailing research on accounting convergence (Gannon & Ashwal, 2004; Tokar, 2005; 
Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). It is claimed that, "it is, however, the right objective and 
one that should be pursued vigorously, as it offers tremendous opportunities for all 
involved…" (Tokar, 2005, p.710) and "[accounting convergence]…will contribute to the 
economic betterment for us all" (Nicolaisen, 2005, p. 685). The processes of accounting 
convergence may provide positive returns in the global economic system. For example, 
international standards may reduce the cost of capital for organizations and provide new 
opportunities for investors (Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). However, a dissenting few 
challenged this notion of benign betterment (Cooper et al., 2003; Hopwood, 1994; 
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Lehman, 2005a, 2005b; McCombie & Deo, 2005). 
Supposing in the vein of mainstream accounting theory that the policies of 
accounting convergence are concentrated exclusively, or at least chiefly, on 
unprecedented and exponential growth of the economic sector, the processes of its 
institutional creation, procedural accountability, societal inclusion, and imposition of 
global control demand high order on the accounting agenda (Giddings et al., 2002; 
Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a, 2005b; UN, 1987). The issues concerning the authority 
and capacity to regulate accounting convergence are well noted by Cooper and Robson 
(2006). One approach requires questioning the structural realities and institutional 
democracy of the international accounting regulator directly (Laughlin, 1999, 1995).  
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) asserted that the establishment of international 
accounting standards is, “one of the economically and politically most important areas 
where governance functions have been delegated to the private sector” (p. 400). There are 
many compelling reasons to delegate such authority. According to Principal-Agent 
literature the decision to delegate is attractive when the economic or political costs of 
internal production are greater than the external costs. For example, governmental 
regimes may not have the resources to attract and maintain the expertise necessary to 
produce high quality regulation. Moreover, private bodies are not encumbered by the 
bureaucracy often associated with governmental processes (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a).  
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Respective of this level of assumed importance; however, there is a noted lack of 
accountability built into the regulatory process of setting international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS) (Brown, 2004; Cooper & Robson, 2006; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2005; 
Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). The regulatory responsibility for promulgating IFRSs 
was “delegated to (or effectively been acquired by)” (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 399) the 
IASB in 2001. The IASB is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) primarily funded by 
large corporations, accounting firms, stock exchanges, banking institutions, and other 
interested stakeholders (Brown, 2004). The IASB operates at a transnational level 
virtually free of traditional nation-state governmental controls (Kingsbury et al, 1999). 
Although the IASB is not a democratically valid body per se a host of prevailing parties 
such as the World Bank, Bank of International Settlements, SEC, United Nations, and 
national government officials have formally legitimized them as the global accounting 
regulator (Buthe & Mattli, 2005a, 2005b; Cooper & Robson, 2006).  
 From inception the IASB has been criticized for its western-centric organizational 
structure and membership (Brown, 2004; Giddings et al., 2002; Lehman, 2005a; Neu et 
al., 2005). In 2002 only 1 of the IASB’s 14 board members hailed from a developing 
country (Brown, 2004). The IASB’s constitution limits board membership to English 
speaking accounting experts (IASC, 2000). This; however, is not unreasonable (Mattli & 
Buthe, 2005b). For example, it is reasonable for the average person to expect that 
accounting regulators need members with accounting expertise. Furthermore, Mattli and 
Buthe (2005b) explained this phenomenon as resulting from an uneven geographical 
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distribution whereas the majority of accounting experts are concentrated in America and 
the United Kingdom. 
Other criticisms of the IASB relate to procedural transparency and inclusion 
(Hopwood, 1994; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b; McCombie & Deo, 2005); national 
legitimacy (Schmidt, 2002), regulatory fairness in the face of diverging interest (Chand & 
White, 2007), and the influence of international organizations (Caramanis, 2002; Graham 
& Neu, 2003; Lehman, 2005). Yet in light of such serious criticisms few have aptly 
examined the IASB’s larger role in globalization and society (Cooper & Robson, 2006; 
Graham & Neu, 2003). To this Lehman (2005b) warned, “…without a full analysis of 
their [non-governmental organizations] role in civil society, it is possible that they will be 
captured by external forces, including but not limited to economic logic that guides a 
corporate mandate to maximise [sic] outputs and minimise [sic] costs” (p. 3).  
During the last decade the landscape of global accounting regulation has morphed 
at an exponential pace. Existing nonprofit organizations have been capitalized and 
revamped while new nonprofit organizations have been legitimized before incorporation 
articles and by-laws were released in print. Perhaps the world’s financial markets have 
been captured by external forces. Or, perhaps centralized financial regulation and the 
aggressive promotion of standardized international financial systems is a public service. 
Such answers, of course, remain to be seen and should be explored by accounting 
scholars (Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005b).  
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Purpose of the Study 
 The work herein promotes a broader, more inclusive understanding of how 
accounting technology is mobilized in the global sphere. It is theorized that a systematic 
concentration on the organizations involved with global regulation is necessary to 
illuminate the underlying network driving accounting convergence (Cooper & Robson, 
2006; Graham & Neu, 2003). Further that such a network has a profound, if not superior, 
impact on the purposes, intents, and overall direction of accounting convergence 
(Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 1999; Granovetter, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Lehman, 
2005a; Rowley, 1997). A critical exploration, such as the present work, contributes a 
fundamental holistic description of the IASB’s greater governance network, which is 
lacking at present.  
Transparent knowledge of the actual power structures is sparse and seemingly 
well hidden within the published context of the IASB’s organizational structure. Such 
vagueness only exacerbates attempts to understand or even explain the administrative 
issues previously discussed in the realm of international accounting regulation (Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Perry & Nolke, 2006). This fact; however, is not 
coded to discount the professionalism, expertise or talent of accounting professionals in 
general; instead it may infer systematic issues. Accordingly, these issues are approached 
by focusing on the networks of organizations bound by cooperative control, structural 
agreements, and professionalization promulgating international regulation in an 
environment that Habermas (1991) described as, “…private law shrouded in quasi-public 
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authority” (p. 149).  
Buthe and Mattli (2005) speculated that these issues are largely ignored by 
nonaccounting scholars due to self-perceived ignorance, as likely to be noninterest, of 
complex and technical accounting information. Additionally, they theorized that lack of 
procedural inclusion and IASB transparency excludes many mainstream accounting 
professionals with the technical expertise to appreciate these issues. In so much, an 
analysis uncomplicated by procedural accounting jargon, at least to the degree possible, 
supplies a building block for reflection on global accountancy. This is to stimulate 
discourse; regardless if the resulting discourse is positive, negative or neutral (Hopwood, 
1994; Lehman, 2005b). Hence, the purpose of positive analysis of the structural forces 
underlying international accounting regulation is to contribute insights which may be 
used by the public, politicians, and scholars alike to conceptualize the complex network 
of organizational as well as individual actors promulgating international accounting 
regulation. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Although critical accounting theory remains on the fringe of accounting 
scholarship, its small following has grown in recent decades. As Roslender (2006) 
explained the underlying goal of critical scholarship is to bring awareness to the 
accounting profession, as well as those outside the profession, of the conditions and 
consequences of accounting action. Disregarding the various ideological positions of 
critical theory, one theme emerged consistent among early critical scholars. Namely, 
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many critical scholars emphasize the role of superstructural factors (Laughlin, 1995; 
Laughlin & Puxty, 1985; Roslender).  
The milieu of the IASB is complex for traditional sociological analysis (Jones et 
al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). To overcome this complexity issue, much existing literature on 
the milieu of the IASB and/or its stakeholder relationships is rooted in traditional 
sociological analysis limiting the population of study to the IASB, a subset of its funding 
organizations or its regulatory standards (Brown, 2004; Brown, Tower, & Taplin, 2004; 
Caramanis, 2002; Lehman, 2005a; Neu et al., 2006). In such studies positivistic or 
institutional ideological positions are traditionally assumed. The value of such studies is 
not questioned; yet, the progression of identifying the broader milieu in which the IASB 
operates remains neglected (Laughlin, 1999; Laughlin & Puxty, 1983). Putting forth a 
bounded social network for the IASB explicitly requires a nontraditional exploratory 
study to bridge this caveat in existing literature. 
A triangulation of theoretical perspectives is one approach to redress such caveats. 
The proposed triangulation critically appraises multiple theoretical approaches 
concurrently employed in accounting research to, “…capture a comprehensive, holistic, 
and contextual portrayal” (Hopper & Hoque, 2006, p. 478) of the IASB’s governance 
network. Moreover, this approach is capable of informing broader potentialities not 
currently accessible at an individual theory level. Due to differing ontological and 
epistemological perspectives, this approach is not without debate, the magnitude of which 
is to vast to include here. Thus, a defensive preamble is fitting (Roslender, 2006).  
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First, triangulation of multiple theoretical perspectives is generally accepted by 
accounting researchers (Hopper & Hoque, 2006; Klumps, 2001). Second, the philosophy 
of science can make very few, if any, claims lending supremacy to one theoretical 
position over another (Geyer, 2003). To this point, multiple epistemological positions are 
vital if academia is to keep pace with society’s need for information (Savage & Burrows, 
2007). Third, theoretical hypocrisy can be, and is, viewed as “dubious” (Hopper & 
Hoque, 2006; Latour, 1999). To illustrate, Klumps (2001) found that accounting 
regulators in the U.S. intentionally disregarded certain theoretical perspectives over 
others to favor the interest of more powerful stakeholders.  
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) studied the IASB’s global governance using a modified 
P-A theory framework. Specifically they asserted: 
Regulatory institutions like IASB and FASB, however, are not fixed structures…We 
focus here on an important dimension of change: change in the extent to which these 
bodies have embraced, resisted, instituted, or rejected mechanisms of administrative 
law…We seek to explain such changes as well as the general operation of private-
sector accounting governance as a function of political and structural factors, such as 
power, control, dependency, and knowledge asymmetries. (p. 228)  
 
Although the above excerpt is reflected herein, the epistemological foundations differ 
greatly. P-A theory is methodologically stiff in that its predictive value hinges on the 
ability to examine singular, unilateral ties between an actor and a principal (Prossor, 
2005). Mattli and Buthe (2005b) attempted to correct this shortcoming by theorizing the 
existence of multiple principals. This stretches the notions of P-A theory, albeit not in a 
fully unacceptable manner. When applied in this manner the theory is represented as the 
distance of a public principal (P) and 2 competing stakeholder groups (SH1 and SH2) on 
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a particular policy dimension (X) (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 233).  
The limitations of stakeholder theory as a whole are obvious. The rigid 
positivistic assumptions fail to provide a comprehensive mapping of the IASB’s 
governance network. In fact, such shortcomings are frequently cited by critics. For 
example, the isolated focus on dyadic relationships between known, and consequently 
important, stakeholder groups often “ignores or mistreats other stakeholders” (Alam, 
2006, p. 207). On one hand, the conceptualization that organizations will satisfy 
important stakeholder groups that provide operational and/or financial viability is 
necessarily sound. On the other hand, Mattli and Buthe’s (2005b) stakeholder theory 
cannot fully conceptualize complex stakeholder relationships in motion. 
 A more naturalistic approach to organizational viability can be found in 
legitimacy theory. Legitimacy is commonly accepted as, 
 A condition or status which exists when an entities value system is congruent with 
the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When 
disparity, actual or potential, exists between two value systems there is a threat to the 
entity’s legitimacy. 
(Lindblom as cited in Deegan, 2006, p. 162)  
 
Legitimacy theory assumes that social systems are temporally as well as spatially 
situational as they are dependent upon socially constructed norms (Deegan, 2006). This 
concept of situational dependency introduces a necessary contrast to P-A theory. For 
example, legitimacy theory presupposes that as socially constructed expectations change 
so must the organizations that depend on societal legitimacy for survival. Thus, the 
theoretical divergence is slight, nonetheless critical. For example, P-A theory assumes a 
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predictable state of divergence within a stable organizational system; whereas, legitimacy 
theory assumes a diverging organizational response within a socially constructed reality. 
Clearly, the latter is acknowledged herein. 
 Legitimacy theory alone; however, is inherently problematic. It is supposed that 
the IASB, according to legitimacy theory, exhibits a profound legitimacy gap. Or, as 
defined by Deegan (2006), “a lack of correspondence (or a ‘gap’) between how a society 
believes an organization should act and how it is perceived that the organization has 
acted” (p. 163, emphasis original). Accordingly, by forcing such normative judgments 
legitimacy theory is overly complicated given the exploratory nature of the present study. 
Both the methodological individualism of P-A theory and the normative basis of 
legitimacy theory neglect the underlying importance of social structure. Granovetter 
(1992) posited that social structures, such as the IASB’s governance network, albeit 
dynamic, “…are constructed by individuals whose action is both facilitated and 
constrained by the structure and the resources available in social networks in which they 
are embedded” (p. 7). However, this is not the case with Mattli and Buthe’s (2005b) P-A 
theory which to a certain degree presupposes the stability of network structures.  
White, Boorman, and Beiger (1976) wrote, “…that the presently existing, largely 
categorical descriptions of social structure have no solid theoretical grounding; 
furthermore network concepts may provide the only way to construct a theory of social 
structure” (p. 732). In as much, social network theory corrects the above issues noted 
with P-A theory and legitimacy theory. For example, social network theory can reconcile 
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that the IASB operates in a politically charged, dynamic milieu prejudiced by a litany of 
interested parties lobbying for consideration (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe, 
2005a, 2005b). Moreover, in order to fully appreciate this web of influence it is necessary 
to examine the relational ties between the IASB and its stakeholders at both the 
organizational and the individual levels. Again to achieve these ends one can refer to the 
theoretical and methodological contributions of social network theory (Jones et al., 1997; 
Rowley, 1997; White et al., 1976). 
In sum, the naturalistic ontology of legitimacy theory is appropriate when 
combined with the less normative analysis of diverging interests found in P-A theory. 
The honored epistemological and ontological propositions of the aforementioned theories 
perfectly complement social network theory which stresses sophisticated methodological 
analysis over philosophical ideology (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). For these reasons 
social network analytics used as a harmonizing methodological tool corrects the issues 
noted above while also achieving the objectives herein. 
Assumptions 
Recent research in critical accounting literature has focused on the relationship of 
accounting to globalization (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006) as well as its impacts on society 
by means of economical, cultural or political demonstrations (Arnold, 2004; Brown, 
2004; Caramanis, 2002; Neu et al., 2005). These efforts have produced divergent 
theoretical propositions suggesting that financial accounting is a powerful influence in 
the progression of globalization (Gallhoer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Mattli 
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& Buthe, 2005a). Hereby it is assumed that accounting convergence serves an integral 
role in globalization and an absolute role toward the creation of a unified worldwide 
economic system. 
Several general assumptions are explicit in social network methodology. First, it 
is assumed that the patterns derived by manipulating relational ties within group 
boundaries are able to produce meaningful results. These basic assumptions remain intact 
although the consensus on whether these results are causal, predictive, probable, or 
descriptive varies greatly depending on the theorist, method, fit, and data (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1999). Second, it is assumed that network positions restrain actors (Burt, 1976). 
Or, that the degrees to which actors are autonomous to pursue individualistic goals is a 
function of their structural position within a given network (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 
1993). Finally, it is assumed that actors are both purposeful and rational (Burt, 1976; 
Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1993). In these respects actors commonly create, employ, 
control, or manipulate network structures to achieve desired outcomes (Granovetter, 
2001; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997).  
Koza and Lewin (1999) argued that alliance networks are “rationally 
constructed…and may be reasonability viewed as instrumentalities for accomplishing 
intended aims” (p. 640). Their position is consistent with the conditions of structural 
embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997), network stakeholder influence (Rowley, 1997), and 
exchange network power (Markovsky, Willer, & Patton, 1988). In particular Koza and 
Lewin found that elite accounting firms/professionals intentionally created a thriving 
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alliance network—Nexia International—for the purposes of strategically capitalizing on 
the internationalization of accounting standards. It is assumed that the IASB’s 
governance network represents this form of a strategic alliance network. This position is 
further supported throughout these writings. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study provides a positive examination of existing data for the purposes of 
teasing out the IASB’s governance network. The goal was not to conclude an exhaustive 
depiction of stakeholders, define their degree of interest, or assign finite levels of 
influence per se; but to provide a holistic picture of this governance network enriched 
with finely crafted empirical details (Laughlin, 1995, 1983).  
The official authority for promulgating IFRSs rests with the IASB board. The 16 
members of the IASB board have sole sanction, by majority vote, to enact a particular 
accounting treatment. They are such an integral part of the standard setting process that 
the entire organization is simply referred to as the IASB. Thus the power and influence of 
IASB board is not questioned (Brown, 2004). Although the influence of the IASB board 
is assumed to have a considerable impact on the standard setting process, it remains only 
a portion of the whole organization and an even smaller portion of the financial 
regulation governance network (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Kingsbury, 2005; Jones et al., 
1997).  
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To define this governance network the IASB was considered the focal 
organization. An ego-centric sampling technique was employed in subsequent sections to 
affix the governance network’s boundaries. Accordingly these boundaries represent the 
single population of study otherwise referred to as the IASB’s governance network.  
Multiple modalities, or levels of analysis, were applied to the governance 
network. Multiple modalities naturally arise in multi-organizational networks. These 
modalities arise from the assumption that individual actors constitute the governance 
network and the organizations to which each individual is affiliated are also embedded 
within the same network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
Moreover, multiple modalities are used to enhance the validity of these conclusions via 
methodological triangulation. 
Relational data were used to create a representation of the IASB’s governance 
network structure. The resulting picture symbolizes a “neutral framework” (White et al., 
1976, p. 732) for analyzing the IASB’s governance network (Laughlin, 1983). That is, 
drawing causal inferences or predictably was cautiously avoided. Even further, 
generalizability to any other network was not implied. These results solely represent the 
population of interest or the IASB’s governance network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
These data; however, are deterministic. In that the measured relations accurately 
reflect the underlying structure of the governance network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
Expressly, a priori categories and/or attributes are not imposed nor are they required 
(Freidkin, 1993; Hanneman & Riddle; Wasserman & Faust, 1999; White et al., 1976). 
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Instead the actors are bound by their relational ties within the network to produce 
analytical imagines that should be “specifically interpreted for specific populations” 
(White et al., 1976, p. 731). 
The direction for these outcomes was informed by critical accounting theory. In 
so much this contribution risks being prematurely discounted by scholars of the 
functionalists sort or overly applied by scholars with similar concerns (Latour, 1999). In 
defense prevailing functionalistic theories do not allow for broader accounting 
perspectives such as this (Roslender, 2006). As a result, many mainstream scholars all but 
disregard the consequences of accounting; only to exuberate the functionalist mantra 
ingrained by a rigorous professionalization process (Cooper & Robson; Granovetter, 
1992). Why is a connection between accounting and society, other than economic benefit 
of course, so difficult to accept?  
Seminal theorists including, but certainly not limited to, Kant (1992/1724-1804), 
Hegel (1977/1952), Nietzsche (2003/1913), and Foucault (1969) allow such inquiry to 
proceed. As stressed by Roslender (2006) critical accounting theory is not necessarily 
incompatible with the percepts of scientific inquiry. Moreover, the empirical focus of 
critical theorists, such as Laughlin (1995), affirmed that objective empirical findings are 
themselves substantial contributions. For example, the objective contributions of social 
network analysis are robustly validated in similar empirical studies (Freidkin, 1993, 
2004; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Moody, 2004; Moody & White, 2003). The scope here, 
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“…becomes the theory for this particular event” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 67) wholly 
incompatible with nomological law-like generalizations. 
Limitations 
Although structural analysis of social networks has earned a respectable alter in 
social research design, considerable care must be exercised when employing these 
methods (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As detailed above causal implications are avoided; 
particularly since such inferences are often made in error by social network researchers 
(Bonacich, 1987; Burt, 1987). Social network analytics is theoretically rooted in the 
present; the graphic representations carry no claims to the past or future. Network 
analysis, when causal inference is avoided, depicts what currently is; not what it should 
be and definitely not what it will be. This representation, of course, is temporally induced 
as dynamic political, organizational, and other complex factors are inherent to the very 
human activity of accounting (d’Arcy, 2001). For example, the IASB’s influences are 
acutely confounded by the international political environment (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b). 
Another obvious limitation is that alternative standard setting bodies and/or 
regulatory practices were not identified. Although it is suggested that inherent problems 
exist with the IASB’s current structure, recommendations for specific improvements are 
beyond the scope of this research. It is rather easy to be critical of the IASB and its 
stakeholders. On the other hand, depending on one’s perspective a case for positive 
potentiality can be made (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006). 
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Finally, the troublesome aspects of critical theory are acknowledged. This work 
made no attempt to reconcile concerns between critical theorists in the postmodern and 
modern camps (Burrell, 1994). In this respect, references to Habermas (1991) does not 
imply modernity de facto; Foucault (1969), Kant (1992), and Nietzsche (2003) are 
equally informed. These arguments are avoidable, conceivably for future inclusion, with 
an intentional departure from critical theory, perhaps fatally for classification as such. 
The rationale for this decision is simple: to maintain objectivity through verifiable 
empirical methodology. The heart of these issues, namely moral reasoning, was left for 
interpretation.  
Research Design 
Social network methodology is particularly suited for rigorously examining 
complex, interorganizational relationships (Bonacich, 1987; Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al., 
1997; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Sociological methods traditionally 
founded on qualitative concepts, which are statistically manipulated as quantitative data 
collapse, or at the very least suffer, when dealing with whole networks (Aziz & McLeay, 
2007; Gerlach, 1992; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In fact, White et al. (1976) argued that 
social network methodology offers the only tools suited for this type of inquiry. This 
approach presents a diverse, yet complementary, method for studying the IASB and 
consequently the preferable method for providing rich conceptual details not available to 
other methods (Koza & Lewin, 1999; Jones et al, 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
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It is not implied that traditional sociological methods are not without considerable 
merit; instead that they are inappropriate for this type of structural analysis (Aziz & 
McLeay, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). For 
example, Gerlach’s (1992) utilization of social network methods to explore the overall 
Japanese corporate network contributed powerful holistic insights that only 
complimented and enhanced the rich literature of more traditional studies. On this point, 
Aziz and McLeay (2007), also noting the limits of traditional methods, developed an 
index of accounting harmonization via global financial statement comparability. Their 
study was based on modeling notations, specifically cross-sectional linear regressions, 
that are remarkably similar to the sociometric notions and mathematical equations used in 
the present work. Additionally, Koza and Lewin (1999) successfully employed social 
network techniques in an empirical examination of firms within the accounting 
profession.  
For these reasons an exploratory case study methodology coupled with social 
network tools was selected to examine the IASB’s governance network. Specifically 
Yin’s (2003) embedded case study guidance for existing documentation analysis was 
adopted. Social network analyses were used to produce a graph of the whole IASB’s 
governance network as well as to test the network’s structural property of embeddedness 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Further analysis of the network actors’ geographic 
representation as well as professional perspectives added another layer of conceptual 
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detail. Finally, the aforementioned designed was applied to answer the below research 
questions. 
Definitions of Terms 
This section contains some basic concepts and terminology from social network 
theory used in these writings. These concepts are defined in terms of social network 
theory. Additional clarification is also provided for specialized use within this context. 
Accounting convergence: The convergence of national accounting regulations into 
a single set of internationally applicable financial reporting standards (Ruder et al., 2005). 
IASB’s governance network: The IASB’s governance network is a theoretical 
entity marked by an intentional network structure (Jones, et. al, 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
The boundaries of this network are based on authoritative control via governance charters 
and other such administrative ties.  
Social network analysis: Wasserman and Faust (1999) described social network 
analysis as a process used, “…to express relationally defined theoretical concepts by 
providing formal definitions, measures, and descriptions, to evaluate models and theories 
in which key concepts and propositions are expressed as relational processes or structural 
outcomes…”(p. 5).  
Social network data: Social network data are characterized by Wasserman and 
Faust (1999) as, “at least one structural variable measured on a set of actors” (p. 28).  
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Social network: A social network is a discrete set of actors and the relation(s) 
ascribed to them (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Social networks can be either 1-mode or 2-
mode networks.  
Modes: Wasserman and Faust (1999) defined a mode as a network term used, 
“…to refer to a distinct set of entities on which the structural variables are measured” (p. 
29).  
One-mode networks: In a 1-mode network the structural variable being measured 
is the relationship between a single set of actors within the network or actor to actor ties. 
For example, data on the friendship among students in a school would be considered a 1-
mode network (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). This type of network is used to measure the 
ties between students. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) referred to 1-mode network analysis 
as examining microlevel network properties.  
Two-mode networks: Two-mode networks measure the ties between actors and 
events instead of the ties between actors and actors. As Hanneman and Riddle (2005) 
explained, “data like these involve two levels of analysis (or two ‘modes’). Often, such 
data are termed ‘affiliation’ data because they describe which actors are affiliated 
(present, or members of) which macro structures” (Ch. 17, Introduction section.).  
  Nodes: The specific individual or organizational actors within the network data 
are also referred to as nodes. Or, the actors are the nodes within the social network and 
the organizations are also nodes within a 2-mode network. Nodes can be any social 
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entity. As Wasserman and Faust (1999) clarified, “actors are discrete individual, 
corporate, or collective social units” (p. 17).  
 Individual actors: As mentioned above, actors or nodes within a network can be 
any type of social unit. Individual nodes denote individual persons within the social 
network (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
 Organizational actors: For these purposes, an organizational actor or node is a 
specific organization within the social network. For example, the IASB as a collective 
social unit represents an organizational actor or node. 
Relations: Hanneman and Riddle (2005) asserted that, “social network data are 
defined by actors and relations (or ‘nodes’ and ‘edges’)” (Ch. 1, Nodes section). 
Relations are the structural variables by which the actors are measured (Borgatti & 
Everett, 2006; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
Relational ties: The social ties, or relations, that link the actors to one another 
within the social network are relational ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
Graph: A graph or graphic representation (G) is a mathematical object comprised 
of vertices (V) and edges (E). Therefore graphs are commonly denoted as G(V,E). Figure 
1 below illustrates a basic, non-directional graph. The nodes or vertices include a, b, c, d, 
and e and are denoted as V={a, b, c, d, e}. These nodes can be defined to represent 
specific organizational or individual actors depending on the network data. The lines 
represent the edges, or relational ties, in the below graph. In social networks the edges 
measure instances or relationships between the nodes. For example, the relationship 
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between node a and node b is denoted as e(a,b). Accordingly the complete set of edges in 
the below graph can be denoted as E={(a,b),(b,c),(c,d),(c,e),(e,d)} (Borgatti & Everett, 
2006). Or, node a has a relational tie with node b, node b has a relational tie with node c, 
node c has a relational tie with nodes d and e, and so forth. 
 
Note: Created with NetDraw 2.081 cited as Borgatti, 2002. 
Figure 1: Basic non-directional graph.  
 
A set of actors or nodes can also be referred to as N. In Figure 1 the set N contains 
all actors or N = {a,b,c,d,e}. The term lines, or for directed graphs arcs, are often used 
interchangeably for the term edges. A single relation can be described as l and the entire 
set of relations as L. Thus, in Figure 1 L is the same as E or L = 
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{(a,b),(b,c),(c,d),(c,e),(e,d)}. A specific relation or instance, for example the relation of 
node a to node b, can be denoted as l (a,b) (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
Sociometric notation: Social network data can also be presented in sociometric 
notation. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) defined sociometric notation as simply, “a 
rectangular arrangement of a set of elements” (Ch. 5, What is a matix? section). 
Sociometric notation is typically displayed in the form of sociomatrices. 
Sociomatrices: Sociomatrices, also referred to as datasets herein, are a collection 
of columns and rows used to display the relationship between nodes. The matrix for the 
graph depicted in Figure 1 is presented in Figure 2 below. Figure 2 represents an 
adjacency matrix, which is perfectly square with the columns and rows representing the 
actors—often denoted as an n x n matrix (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). According to 
Hanneman and Riddle (2005), “network data in their purest form” (Ch. 1, Introduction 
section) is structured as an adjacency or n x n matrix. However, rectangular data arrays—
rows represent actors and columns represent attributes—are also considered network data 
matrices (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
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  A B C D E 
A 0 1 0 0 0 
B 0 0 1 0 0 
C 0 0 0 1 0 
D 0 0 0 0 1 
E 0 0 1 1 0 
 
Note: Exported from Ucinet 6 cited as Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002. 
Figure 2: Binary adjacency matrix for Figure 1.  
 
Dataset: Herein the term dataset has been adopted to refer to rectangular data 
matrices as well as adjacency matrices. A dataset is assumed to be rectangular unless 
specifically defined as a square adjacency matrix. 
Research Questions 
It is proposed that the IASB’s governance network is marked by an intentional, 
elaborate network structure based on authoritative control via governance charters and 
other such administrative ties. If inter-organizational relationships act as purposeful 
social mechanisms embedded within a given governance network to coordinate and 
safeguard exchanges, then the governance network of the IASB should exhibit specific 
characteristics. To this point it is supposed that the IASB’s governance network structure 
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is highly dense, lowly centralized, and notably structurally embedded (Granovetter, 1992; 
Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
Social network analytics were employed to determine the structural properties of 
the IASB’s governance network. This objective was focused by the following research 
questions: 
I.) Which organizations constitute the IASB’s governance network when defined in 
terms of social network theory and how are these organizations hierarchically 
arranged? 
II.) What professional perspectives are represented by the individual actors within the 
IASB’s governance network?  
III.) What geographic locations are represented by the individual actors within the 
IASB’s governance network? 
IV.) To what extent are the strategic members of the IASB’s governance network 
structurally embedded as measured by relational ties such as co-directorship, 
employment or board memberships? 
 
Significance of the Study 
 The purpose of positive analysis of the structural forces underlying international 
accounting regulation is to contribute insights which may be used by the public, 
politicians, and scholars alike to conceptualize the totality of international accounting 
regulation. However, many stakeholders shy away from accounting discourse because 
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they perceive it to be too complex or too technical for full appreciation by non-
accountants (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). It is in part this ignorance gap that has 
facilitated the IASB’s hushed domination over international accounting regulation and 
conceivably the more menacing prospect of outside domination over the IASB. Thus, this 
work presents a significant contribution to accounting scholarship since it omits much of 
the practical technicality of prior discourse on accounting convergence and is geared 
toward all interested parties. Technical accounting jargon is limited or presented in such 
as way as not to detract from the conclusions. However a uniform littering of acronyms is 
unavoidable. For these reasons an appendix is provided to aid the reader.  
 If nothing else, it is time for the broader stakeholders of financial markets to 
rethink the ordre naturel of capitalistic policies and examine the superstructural forces 
embedding such policies within global society. Although this work makes no 
recommendations for collection action per se, it is significant to note that scholarly 
inquiries can, and consequently do, inform such actions. The average taxpayer or investor 
is as affected by accounting regulations as an illiquid financial institution or an 
accounting professional. Currently, nearly all stakeholders of the financial system are at a 
crossroads. In that, the relatively unattended global governance system does not inform 
the onslaught of unprecedented events demanding immediate attention by broader 
stakeholder groups, who often lack general knowledge of an often obscured accounting 
regulatory environment. 
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It is imperative that scholars, governments, and interested parties diligently 
examine the IASB’s progression to ensure that often conflicting interests are regarded 
with positive consideration. Considering the ambiguous state of international accounting 
regulation, exploring the emerging governance network structure of the IASB seems to 
be of urgent concern (Kingsbury et al., 2005). This urgency is deduced from the 
exponential rate in which international accounting has infiltrated the global financial 
system during the last decade; yet, a basic identification of the stakeholder structure and 
its impact on accounting regulation is notably absent from current literature. Of first and 
foremost concern is mapping the structure of this governance network.  
The exploratory nature of this dissertation symbolizes one of the first endeavors to 
holistically define the broader governance network influencing accounting convergence, 
whereby recognition is the first step toward active involvement. In particular, the 
significant contribution herein is an empirical definition of the organizations which 
constitute the IASB’s governance network. Moreover, supplementary conceptual details 
about the governance network are offered in hopes that future research will build on these 
efforts.  
In sum, the technical aspect of this work is meant to engage accounting 
researchers. On the other hand, the attempted neutrality of this work is an effort to bridge 
technical gaps and inform, possibly engage, various interested stakeholder groups, who 
may or may not be interested in the technical craft of accounting; but who possess a 
vested interest in global society. Finally, the expected societal benefit is to encourage 
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discourse by both groups about the diversity of representation in accounting regulatory 
processes with both macro and micro consequences. 
Summary and Overview 
The recurring theme behind the construct of globalization seems to be economic 
interconnectiveness (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; OECD, 2005; 
Sirgy et al., 2004). The goal of promulgating IFRSs is undoubtedly to foster global 
economic interconnectiveness on an unprecedented scale (Nicolaisen, 2005; Ruder et al., 
2005). Through formal and informal cooperative agreements the IASB has been grated 
global authority for this monumental event. Increasingly issues related to the IASB’s 
organizational structure are being noted by critical scholars (Brown, 2004, Hopwood, 
1994). 
The purpose of accounting convergence has always been economic betterment 
(Nicolaisen, 2005; Tweedie, 2005). This intent; however, does not guarantee uniform 
economic betterment or even the efficacy of economic betterment in general. In fact, 
many notable works suggest just the opposite (Anwar, 2002; Fenelon & Murguía, 2008; 
UN, 1987). Further questioning such claims may be forthcoming in the wake of the U.S. 
credit crisis. 
To conceptualize the IASB’s stakeholders principal-agent theory and legitimacy 
theory are reviewed in chapter 2. Social network theory is also detailed. Following this 
theoretical framing the IASB’s governance network is identified using an ego-centric 
sampling technique derived from social network theory. The research design based on 
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social network methodology is developed in chapter 3. The results for each of the four 
research questions are presented in chapter 4. Finally, these results are discussed followed 
by concluding remarks in chapter 5.
  
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Scholarly research databases were searched to find literature pertaining to 
stakeholder theory, global administrative law, social network theory and accounting 
convergence. These topics served as the initial search terms. This search yielded many of 
the sources included here as well as additional search terms and subject areas. Moreover, 
the citations provided within selected literature were also utilized to contribute to this 
work. 
Kingsbury et al. (2005) argued that international accounting regulation occurs 
within a global administrative space. One imperative consequence is that many aspects of 
global administrative law—creation, enforcement, and regulation to name a few—cannot 
be effectively addressed at a singular nation-state level. For this reason the global sphere 
is becoming increasingly reliant on transgovernmental organizations such as the IASB to 
create, monitor, and implement global regulations (Lehman, 2005b). Thus the global 
administrative space for accounting regulation is subsequently defined and its 
characteristics are discussed.
When delegation of accounting regulation is made to a private agent such as the 
IASB, Mattli and Buthe (2005a) suggested that, “…one group of stakeholders will 
inherently benefit from delegation at another group’s expense” (p. 405). Once democratic 
control is disabled the questions of stakeholder interest and influence become of critical 
importance. To understand the effects of stakeholder interest and influence, stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory were triangulated. In particular, a modified P-A theory 
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which builds on the work of Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) was juxtaposed with 
Deegan’s (2006) legitimacy theory. Neither theory, individual or in total, is sufficient to 
examine the underlying structural and/or superstructural features of the IASB’s 
governance network. Thus social network theory was introduced as a fitting handmaiden 
theory to overcome such limitations (Granovetter, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 
1997). 
The remaining subsections are dedicated to describing the organizations 
constituting the IASB’s governance network. Using an ego-centric sampling technique 
the process begins with the focal organization or the IASB (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
The governance network is then expanded by reviewing formal documentation such as 
organizational charters, bylaws, and articles of incorporation to include the organizations 
holding express power to influence international accounting regulations. The governance 
network is also expanded laterally to include other international standard setting agencies 
involved with accounting convergence. To add conceptual richness a brief overview for 
each organizational actor is provided. 
Global Administrative Law: A Global Space for Accounting 
 Accounting in the context of globalization is often presented in such broad 
conceptualizations that it is of little substance. Hence research efforts must focus on the 
“concrete and specific mechanisms” (Graham & Neu, 2003, p. 449) underlying this 
nebulous of interaction. One such identifiable mechanism is the process of creating 
global administrative law. The study of global administrative law is in its infancy. Global 
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administrative law is defined by Kingsbury et al. (2005) as:  
…comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global 
administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of 
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing 
effective review of the rules and decisions they make. (p. 17) 
  
Global administrative law is becoming increasingly important as societies become 
increasingly interdependent and traditional geographic boundaries are replaced by 
electronic unity. Areas of global interest include security, environmental protection, 
banking, financial regulation, law enforcement, labor standards, and humanitarian aid to 
name a few (Kingsbury et al., 2005, p.16).  
A global reach is deemed essential to effectively address the scope of the 
aforementioned areas in what could be deemed the world state or as Kingsbury et al. 
(2005) coined a global administrative space. The term global administrative law is 
confined and generally accepted here to include pronouncements, decrees, standards, and 
the like from global administrative bodies that have the ability to bind public and private 
parties in matters of global governance (Kingsbury et al., 2005).  
Absent some sort of regulatory cooperation national bodies are overtly 
insufficient to address the emerging trend of global homology. In response, transnational 
administrative bodies have been established to remedy these insufficiencies as well as to 
erode the margins between national and global barriers (Kingsbury et al., 2005). These 
administrative mechanisms are not limited to formal governmental or intergovernmental 
bodies. Instead, private regulatory bodies such as the IASB are becoming important 
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contributories to the growing form of global administration (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 
2005b). In fact, Cassese (2006) cautioned researchers to avoid the common view that 
global administrators are by default intergovernmental. Deductively, the introduction of 
nongovernmental global administrators alters customary notions, such as traditional 
democratic processes and governmental controls, of national administrative law 
(Kingsbury et al., 2005).  
Mattli and Buthe (2005a) asserted that the delegation of governance over 
international accounting standards to a private body, the IASB, is the most significant 
economic and political example of non-regulatory global administrative law. If so, it is 
questioned here how global regulatory functions are carried out by the IASB. The IASB’s 
nongovernmental, privately funded organizational structure poses significant threats to 
traditional regulatory controls (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Perry & Nolke, 2006). In many 
instances global regulators, in particular nongovernmental organizations like the IASB, 
lack numerous procedural safeguards, such as accountability, oversight, participation in 
the standard setting process, and transparency of the decision making process, found in 
domestic administrative law (Steward, 2005).  
It cannot be argued that the IASB fills an integral, indeed necessary, role in the 
globalization of accounting technologies (Lehman, 2005b). However, it would be in error 
to justifying their existence as an administrator of global administrative law based on the 
economic logic of market efficiency alone (Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005b). That is, 
accounting convergence does not always provide customary economic benefits to the 
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communities that it purports to serve (Caramanis, 2002). Or, that international accounting 
regulation is by default a fair and inclusive process. Instead as Lehman (2005b) observed 
it is time to address how effectively these, “accountability relationships between 
organisations [sic] and society satisfy the objectives of a civil society” (p. 2).  
Nevertheless, the application of global administrative law to accounting 
regulation is the most viable alternative at present. As Kingsbury et al. (2005) stressed 
accounting regulation requires extensive technical expertise which naturally imposes 
some limitations on participation. In this sense global regulation must be streamlined by 
powerful and decisive entities in order to function effectively. For example, a global 
regulation is only binding when and if a nation state decides to enforce it. For these 
reasons it is advantageous to utilize existing theory to scrutinize those responsible for 
accounting regulation in the global administrative space.  
The IASB and Stakeholder Interest 
It is generally accepted that the behavior of an organization is largely determined 
by the interest and level of influence of its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). This 
conceptualization is particularly salient in the arena of accounting regulation considering 
that regulation has been delegated to, or assumed by, nongovernmental stakeholder 
groups. Therefore, many accounting scholars seek to explain accounting regulation as a 
function of inter-related stakeholder claims (Brown, 2004; Brown et al., 2004; Buthe & 
Mattli, 2005; Mattli and Buthe, 2005a, 2005b).  
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In this respect, stakeholder theory strives to balance the demands of various and 
often competing stakeholder groups in order to determine the priorities of an 
organization. In the broadest sense a stakeholder is defined as, “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 
1984, p. 25). It is supposed that widely utilized narrow definitions are mandated by the 
limitations of traditional sociological analysis. For a comprehensive overview of 
stakeholder definitions see Freeman (1984) or more recently Rowley (1997). For 
example, as discussed in Freeman (1984) some definitions include only those groups to 
which the organization has a legally binding relationship. This implies that persons, 
absent legal recourse, are not stakeholders in regard to fair and safe employment, 
equitable exchanges, environmental disturbances, or health and welfare issues. In a 
broader sense residents exposed to toxic waste, employees without recourse, and other 
such persons directly impacted by an organization are clearly stakeholders whether or not 
a legal claim can be exerted. Accordingly it is deduced here that the stakeholders of the 
IASB assume a level of relative importance vis-à-vis the organization itself (Mattli & 
Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). These stakeholders groups affect or possibly direct the 
achievement of the IASB’s objectives (Jones et al. 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
In skillful order Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) applied P-A theory to the 
private regulatory structure of the IASB. P-A theory holds that one actor—the 
principal—delegates decision making authority to another actor –the agent (Mattli & 
Buthe, 2005b, p. 229). Further they theorized that: 
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 …turning to the practice of governance once authority is delegated, we have found 
that, especially when delegation of governance functions is motivated by wanting to 
benefit from the agent's prior expertise [in reference to the setting of technical 
accounting standards], delegation to private agents creates a particular kind of 
multiple principals problem, where the agent ends up with at least two principals—
one public and one private. 
(Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 232) 
 
 Vagueness about the public principal exists in the arena of international 
accounting regulation. An issue diverted by Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b). It is 
questioned whether P-A theory, rooted in the traditions of economic and regulatory 
contracts, can be suitably applied to the complex and ambiguous milieu of the IASB 
(Prosser, 2005). Although the application of P-A theory has considerable merit, in 
particular its ability to isolate and quantify singular interests, straightforward 
principal/agent relationships are methodologically problematic on many levels. This 
conundrum is not wholly lost even by P-A theory proponents (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 
2005b); but particularly noted by critical scholars (Alam, 2006). The appropriateness of 
P-A theory is further troublesome as epistemological notions, such as complexity, gain 
scientific acceptance (Geyer, 2003; Rowley, 1997).  
The naturalistic philosophies of legitimacy theory claim to correct many of the 
underlying epistemological and ontological troubles with P-A theory (Deegan, 2006). For 
example, legitimacy theory presupposes a socially constructed reality both temporally 
and spatially embedded (Deegan, 2006). In this respect legitimacy theory is squarely 
compatible with the emergence of global administrative law. For example, Kingsbury et 
al., (2005) described global administrative law as an emerging social structure to deal 
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with the complexities of global regulation. Conversely, legitimacy theory postulates 
normative judgments subjecting any inquiry to scrutiny, especially at the exploratory 
stage (Deegan, 2006). Ascribing such normative values is beyond the intended purposes 
here. In this respect, the objective basis of operational and/or financial viability posited 
by P-A theory alleviates the need for normative measures. 
A web of conflicting stakeholder interest is preferable to frame the IASB’s 
network governance (Prosser, 2005). This approach is no less challenging in that the 
powerful and respected methodologies necessary are, rather unfortunately, under-applied 
in this area (Laughlin, 1999). Yet, as Rowley (1997) theorized social network analysis 
provides, “…a mechanism for conceptualizing the simultaneous influence of multiple 
stakeholders and predicting organizational responses to these forces” (p. 888). Further 
Jones et al. (1997) posited that social network analysis, in particular “structural 
embeddedness is critical to our understanding of how social mechanisms coordinate and 
safeguard exchanges in networks…” (p. 924).  
Social Network Theory 
 Koza and Lewin (1999) characterized alliance networks as referring to multiparty 
alliances creating a network to facilitate multilateral transactions. Koza and Lewin argued 
that these networks, “represent the old form of new organization” (p. 652) specially 
equipped for handling the complex economic activity in modern times. Alliance networks 
are far from haphazard; instead, purposeful integration into the network is facilitated by 
social control mechanisms, either formal or informal (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jones 
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et al., 1997). The existence of these networks is robustly supported in professional service 
fields (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquest, & Borgatti, 1998) as well as, not 
surprisingly, the accounting profession itself (Koza & Lewin, 1999). 
The development of structural networks in traditional organizational theory can be 
traced back to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) influential work on isomorphic processes. 
DiMaggio and Powell’s theory, empirically well-supported, supposed that Weber’s (as 
cited by DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) concept of bureaucratization, or organizational 
rationalization, was instead structuration of organizational fields. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) defined organizational fields as, “those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life…[and once organizational fields are 
structured]…powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one 
another” (p. 148). Such homogenization is achieved through isomorphic processes. In 
particular, they noted two types of isomorphism—competitive and institutional. The well-
documented former emphasizes market competition, whereas the latter emphasizes 
political power and institutional legitimacy (p. 150).  
The concept of purposeful social networks bears a striking resemblance to the 
idealization of global administrative regulatory structure (Kingsbury et al., 2005). 
Although Kingsbury et al. stopped short of social network theory, they explicitly warned 
that global administrative law is not substantive rules; but the operating processes making 
such rules possible. The pronouncements in this context are of less importance than the 
structures with the power to bind the global world. To illustrate Kingsbury et al. (2005) 
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noted: 
Some of the most dense regulatory regimes have arisen in the sphere of economic 
regulation: the OECD networks and committees, the administration and the 
committees of the WTO, the committees of the G-7/G-8, structures of antitrust 
cooperation, and financial regulation performed by, among other, the IMF, the Basel 
Committee and the Financial Action Task Force. (p. 18-19) 
 
The aforementioned comments are significant on multiple levels. Firstly, the 
authors explicitly supported the existence of rationally structured financial regulatory 
regimes. They do not intend that the formation of these networks is random. On this point 
they proposed that coordinated regulation is “often the very purpose…in fields such 
as…financial practices” (Kingsbury et al., 2005, p. 23). Secondly, is the authors’ use of 
social network terminology, perchance inadvertently, such as dense, networks, and 
structures of financial regulation. Thus marrying global administrative law to social 
network methodology is nearly effortless. 
 Ultimately networks of financial regulation are theoretically defined as 
governance networks. Jones et al. (1997) specified that exchanges within governances 
networks are patterned, neither uniform nor random, in that the patterns define conditions 
within governance forms. Furthermore that analyzing such patterns can be used to 
empirically define governance network structure. Rowley (1997) also supposed the utility 
of using patterns to detect the influence of network structure. In particular, both posited 
the constraining effects of a highly dense, embedded network structure. Although the 
foundations of these propositions are different—the former calls on transaction cost 
analysis while the later on stakeholder theory—the underlying use of social network 
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theory is cohesive.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1990) specified that organizational fields cannot be 
defined a priori. Furthermore the authors proposed four criteria to define organizational 
fields which are harmonious with global administrative regulation structure (Kingsbury et 
al., 2005) as well as stakeholder network theory (Rowley, 1997). Thus the remainder of 
this section is dedicated to defining the IASB’s governance network based on DiMaggio 
and Powell’s criteria. The process begins with the focal organization or the IASB. 
One of the four criteria for structuralization is, “…the emergence of sharply 
defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition” (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1990, p. 148). Since identifiable ties of authority—decision making, 
monitoring, voting or other such powers—are sharply defined, it is argued that the 
presence of such ties merits inclusion into the governance network (Jones et al., 1997). 
Additionally, however, affiliated organizations are weighted in relation to the remaining 
criteria: an increase in interaction, information load, and awareness among the 
participants (DiMaggio & Powell, p. 148). Based on the above criteria a governance 
network is systematically developed below by considering the documented characteristics 
of the IASB’s interorganizational ties. 
Existing organizational data are examined to determine the appropriateness of 
including organizational actors and/or individual actors into the IASB’s governance 
network. Specifically, the criterion of authority, which is operationalized by analyzing the 
organization’s governing body, informs this decision. Governing bodies are defined as 
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the inner circle of authority guiding the organization’s strategic mission, appointing its 
members or managing its operations. The specific focus is the structural network 
providing operational and/or financial viability to the organizations involved with 
international accounting convergence (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). Ironically these 
criteria parallel the modus operandi of the Tripartite Group by looking through the, “legal 
structure” and “focusing on the people who are actually managing” (BIS, 1995, p. 7). 
Furthermore this position theoretically parallels R. Edward Freeman’s (1984) power and 
stakes, Linton Freeman’s (1978) conditions of centrality, Deegan’s (2006) legitimacy 
theory, and Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power. 
Defining the IASB’s governance network 
 Multiple theoretical perspectives were considered above to outline the theoretical 
underpinnings of the IASB’s governance network. Per stakeholder theory it is accepted 
that stakeholder groups affect or possibly direct the achievement of the IASB’s 
objectives. This assumption is furthered by P-A theory which holds that in the face of 
diverging interest the IASB will satisfy the stakeholders providing the greatest amount of 
operational or financial viability (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). However, both of the 
aforementioned theories are ill-equipped to deal with the complex stakeholder 
arrangement of the IASB. Consequently, the assumptions of stakeholder behavior were 
accepted but the underlying assumption of a stable governance network which is 
independent of its stakeholders was rejected. Instead, the governance network was 
viewed in terms of legitimacy theory as a socially constructed reality both temporally and 
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spatially embedded. Social network theory also holds that the underlying network is a 
socially constructed entity that is situationally dependent on both time and place (Jones et 
al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). In as much social network theory was used to harmonize 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory as it provided the methodological tools 
necessary to document complex stakeholder relationships. 
The following subsections are dedicated to defining the IASB’s governance 
network. There are several methods for determining the governance network boundaries 
or more simply the set of nodes which should be included in the governance network. 
Some methods, such as the full network method and snowball method, require that all 
actors and all measurable relationships be documented. Accordingly such methods are 
time consuming, costly, and impractical, even when used in conventional survey research 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Beyond cost and convenience, the intent of the present 
study was not generalization and/or prediction. Instead the intent was to explore how the 
IASB is affected, perhaps constricted, by its governance network. Thus, selecting an 
appropriate mix of nodes to capture the network’s boundaries properly was both central 
and problematic when analyzing an open network system (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
The nodes will be selected using Hanneman and Riddle’s (2005) ego-centric 
sampling approach which is consistent with Wasserman and Faust’s (1999) network 
defining technique. To achieve a holistic approach, alter and lateral connections were also 
considered. Hanneman and Riddle noted that this technique is useful for understanding 
how individuals or organizations fit within a particular network. 
49 
 
 
 
  
Particular emphasis was given to formal interorganizational control mechanisms. 
These mechanisms are defined as formal structural agreements such as articles of 
organization, bylaws, and unilateral accords. The reason for this focus is two-fold. First, a 
network exists if it is evidenced by binding formal agreements (Wasserman & Faust, 
1999). Second, unlike conceptual notions of authority, hierarchical arrangements 
represent express authority. In fact, in an era of interwoven private-public authority these 
arrangements are “…equivalent to classical legal relationships” (Habermas, 1991, p. 
150). 
The IASB: Focal Organization 
 Oversight of the IASB is provided by the International Accounting Standards 
Foundation (IASCF, 2008c). The IASF Foundation is incorporated in Delaware as a 
nonprofit organization. Although the IASF Foundation contends to have no explicit 
power to interfere with IASB standard setting or to influence the agenda, it is manifestly 
responsible for appointing IASB members, Standard Advisory Council (SAC) members, 
as well as International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) members 
(IASB, 2008b). The IASB’s organizational structure is presented in Figure 3 below. 
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IASB—International Accounting Standards Board 
IASF Foundation—International Accounting Standards Foundation 
IFRIC—International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee 
SAC—Standards Advisory Committee 
TAAG—Trustee Appointments Advisory Group 
 
Note: Adapted from organizational chart retrieved from 
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/How+we+are+structured.htm. 
Figure 3: Organizational Structure of the IASB.  
 
 IASF Foundation 
 
16 Independent Trustees 
Appoint IASB, SAC and IFRIC members 
SAC 
More than 30 members from 
various consistencies 
Advise IASB on issues, priorities and 
agenda issues 
IASB 
14 member board 
Establishes standards for 
international financial accounting 
 
IFRIC 
12 member board from various 
consistencies 
Promulgate guidance on 
established IFRS 
 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)  
TAAG 
 
Represented by 6 
organizations 
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A simple majority of 9 IASB members appointed by approximately 16 IASF 
Foundation trustees, who are nominated by the 9 trustees of the TAAG, hold virtually 
perfect authority to enact global accounting regulations, which govern financial 
transactions in over 100 countries (IASB, 2008a; IFACF, 2006). Regardless of expertise, 
surly a group of this size is not as claimed by the IASB, “…representative of the world’s 
capital markets and a diversity of geographical and professional backgrounds” (IASC, 
2000, p. 12).  
Due to the noted lack of transparency, such as nonrequirement of public 
disclosure, there is no way to categorically reveal the number of constituency groups 
influencing the IASB and to what degree they exert this influence. Pragmatically this lack 
of transparency and democratic inclusion is itself troublesome (Brown, 2004; Hopwood, 
1994, Lehman, 2005a, 2005b). Nonetheless, the IASB is a major regulator in a much 
larger network of global financial regulation (Perry & Nolke, 2006). 
In July 2008 the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
issued a discussion paper proposing changes to the IASB’s constitution (IASCF, 2008d). 
The forthcoming Trustees’ proposal is to: “…establish a formal link between the 
organization [IASB] and a Monitoring Group” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 1) as well as, 
“…expand membership of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 16 
members and add new guidelines regarding geographical diversity of the members of the 
IASB” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 1). Specifically the proposal sets forth a rather comprehensive 
review—in accordance to constitutional provision—of the IASB’s organizational 
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structure to be conducted during the 2009 calendar year with recommendations to be 
implemented in the 2010 calendar year. Intriguingly, the 2010 implementation of linking 
to the Monitoring Group as well as the issue of IASB membership are attended to 
separately from the overall review and have been scheduled for accelerated 
implementation in January 2009. 
The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation’s Trustees 
recognized that the IASB will become the “world’s accounting-standard setter” (IASCF, 
2008c, p. 7). Moreover the Trustee’s proposal reaffirmed commitment to the IASB’s 
fundamental premise of independence reinforcing, “confidence in its ability to set 
standards in the public interest by helping to ensure that the creation of IFRSs is not 
beholden to special interest” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 6). In absence of a single authority, such 
as the SEC in the case of the U.S. standard setter, this role is proposed to be assumed by 
the Mentoring Group. Reportedly, “its membership would include public authorities 
generally charged with the adoption of financial reporting standards and international 
organizations with a mandate that includes facilitating the development and effective 
functioning of capital markets” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 10). 
To attend to the questions proposed in the present study the IASB was considered 
the focal organizational node. In addition, individual actors of the IASF Foundation, 
TAAG, IASB board, SAC board, and IFRIC board were also included for actor-level 
analysis. As stated above the Monitoring Group will assume overall authority for the 
IASB in 2009. Therefore this relationship was used to vertically expand the IASB’s 
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governance network. 
The Mentoring Group 
Although the Mentoring Group does not maintain an official public presence per 
se, the IASFC (2008c) proposed that the membership for the Mentoring Group include: 
 (a) responsible member of the European Commission; (b) managing director of the 
International Monetary Fund; (c) the chair of the IOSCO Emerging Markets 
Committee; (d) the chair of the IOSCO Technical Committee (or vice chair or 
designated securities commission chair…); (e) the commissioner of the Japan 
Financial Services Agency; (f) the chairman of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission and; (f) the president of the World Bank. (p. 11-12)  
 
 Very little information is publically available concerning the Mentoring Group 
except for claims of oversight by the accounting regulators themselves. It appears that the 
concept of a regulatory oversight committee was conceived by the FSF, a BIS hosted 
organization, in 2002 when the FSF recommended organized oversight of the IASB. Per 
the FSF’s report (2002):  
BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO evaluate International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs) issued by the IFAC, in order to provide supervisory 
input in the development of existing and new standards in areas of supervisory 
interest. (p. 10) 
 
Notwithstanding questionable origins, the Mentoring Group will assume authority 
(approval) for all IASB Trustee appointments. The nomination process will be revised to, 
“entitle the Mentoring Group to recommend candidates and provide other input” (IASCF, 
2008c, p. 12). In effect the Mentoring Group will approve and consequently provide 
performance reviews for all IASB Trustees. In turn, Trustees must provide annual written 
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reports to the Mentoring Group. Trustees must further comply with mandatory periodic 
as well as ad hoc meetings scheduled by the Mentoring Group. To cement such controls 
the details of these arrangements will be evidenced in an official memorandum of 
understanding between the IASB and the Mentoring Group (IASFC, 2008d).  
Given the Monitoring Group’s forthcoming authority over the IASB these 
organizations are discussed in turn. The Mentoring Group as well as its composite 
organizations discussed below clearly satisfy the authority criteria for organizational 
nodes within the IASB’s governance network. Additionally, the individual actors 
exercising decision making authority, including executive board members, board of 
governors, senior management, were included for actor-level analysis. 
Financial Stability Forum. On August 12, 1999 the FSF issued its first 
comprehensive report (FSF, 1999). With amazing efficiency the FSF quickly produced a 
comprehensive report regarding the current landscape of global administrative law by 
coordinating various efforts with the virtual who’s-who of international agencies. The 
FSF is hosted by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Consistent with the 
sometimes dodge-and-avoid concept of separate legal entity, the BIS claims no legal 
and/or reporting ties to the FSF (BIS, 2008). However, the FSF is financing by, as well as 
physically hosted at, the BIS. Unfortunately the BIS, in rather hypocritical disregard for 
its financial disclosure transparency mantra, does not disclose information pertaining to 
its hosted organizations in its annual financial reports. As a result the valuation of this 
relationship is difficult, if not impossible, at present (BIS, 2008). Of particular note, is 
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that this lack of transparency directly violates international financial reporting standard 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements. 
The official mandate of the FSF (2008a) is to evaluate issues affecting 
international financial systems to “…identify and oversee action necessary to address 
these” (para. 1) and to, “improve corporation and information exchange among the 
various authorities responsible for financial stability” (para. 1). The FSF acts as the 
clearing house, central authority, and strategic advisor for international financial 
regulators (FSF, 2008a; FSF, 2008b). The FSF’s (2008b) serves as a semi-annual report 
card evaluating the activity for virtually every international financial organization. The 
March 2008 report detailed the activities of 20 organizations including those responsible 
for regulating accounting convergence, most notably the IASB, IAASB, IFAC, and the 
PIOB (FSF, 2008b).  
In May 2008 the IASB created an Expert Advisory Panel (EAP) at the 
recommendation of the FSF. This panel—limited to international regulators such as the 
BIS, IOSCO, IAIS, FSF, and a handful of banking, securities and accounting experts—
convened to address valuation techniques as well as disclosures in illiquid markets 
(IASB, 2008b). EAP committee interest seemed to transcend mere panel participation. 
An audio recording of the EAP’s (2008) June 18th meeting suggested potential 
irreconcilable tensions between the IASB and the FSF regulators. To this, bemoaning 
IASB members rhetorically questioned whether immediate action on particular 
accounting standards were being driven by the market, the regulators or by the IASB’s 
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focus on due diligence processes. They replied that neither the accounting standard 
setting bodies nor due diligence were the drivers. With apparent exasperation it is 
insinuated that the IASB is driven by senior supervisors groups promoting so-called best 
practices. The IASB board seemed to question the pressure to react quickly by publishing 
authoritative guidance derived in such a manner.  
One participant at the EAP (2008) meeting voiced concern that the IASB would 
lose sight of is principle-based focus by catering exclusively to international regulators 
and ignoring other user-based groups, effectively becoming a quasi-banking regulator. 
Another IASB board member participant recalled previous pressured guidance—
specifically the 51% ownership requirement for consolidation—which garnered 
overwhelmingly negative reactions from other user groups (EAP, 2008).  
During the EAP (2008) meeting the IASB members were reminded that regulators 
should be imposing the standards instead of standard setting bodies. An international 
banking representative compared the current state of international regulation to that of the 
Japanese market crisis. In his analogy the Japanese accounting standard setting board 
would not comply and/or cooperate with international regulators in that it continued to 
issue its own standards. As a result the Japanese standard setting body was subsequently 
dismantled by political powers. Another participant furthered this apparent threat by 
stating that Brussels—the hub of international regulation—was growing impatient with 
the IASB; that there was a big world of political expectations outside of accounting; that 
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the IASB’s response must be quick guidance before certain individuals in Brussels 
become upset; and that this process was in fact reality (EAP, 2008). 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) operates under the auspices of the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS). Representing the world’s first international or global financial institution the BIS 
was founded in 1930 as part of the Young Plan. Pursuant to the Young Plan, the BIS was 
established to administer German reparation payments from World War I. German 
reparations were financed through international loans, otherwise known as Dawes and 
Young Loans, and the BIS served as the acting trustee for these loans. In as much, the 
BIS administered the first pot of truly global funds (BIS, 2008).  
The BIS’s positioned strengthen as its services became increasingly valuable in 
light of global instabilities such as the Second World War, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the 
international debt crisis of the 1980s and the Asian crisis of the 1990s. As national 
economies became progressively more interdependent a global interest vested in 
controlling, or at least minimizing, the impacts of such crises (BIS, 2008). In response the 
G-10 countries—Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States—created the BCBS. The BCBS’s goal 
was to create standardized international banking regulations to be applied at the national 
level by member countries. In July of 1988 the first international banking regulations, 
known as the Basel Capital Accord, were adopted by G-10 countries (BCBS, 1988). 
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Subsequent revisions to the Basel Capital Accord are presently codified in the Basel II 
(BIS, 2008). 
 The BIS is owned by the world’s central banks, notwithstanding a heavy 
percentage of shares in western countries. In 2001 86% of BIS shares were owned by 
central banks. The remaining 14% were chiefly owned by large, international financial 
institutions such as Goldman Sachs, J. P. Morgan, and the like (Meltzer, 2000). That year 
the BIS unilaterally recalled all privately owned shares. What followed was a rare public 
outrage by certain private shareholders about what they perceived was a less than 
equitable call price. Beyond this dispute; however, Reginald Howe, an obviously gilded 
investor, sued a powerful network of actors for undervaluing the private share call price 
and conspiring to inflate global gold prices. This network included the BIS; Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan; President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, William McDonough; J. P. Morgan Chase; Chase Manhattan Corp.; Citigroup, 
Inc.; Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; Deutsche Bank; Lawrence Summers, and; Paul 
O’Neill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Howe v. BIS, 2001). 
 Although Howe’s case was dismissed, the nature of his accusations bears 
mentioning. Of concern is Howe’s assertion that “the seventeen directors of the BIS 
voted unanimously to adopt the mandatory share redemption plan” (Howe v. BIS, 2001, 
p. 35). This fact, not disputed by the court, befalls a grand image of the small, 
notwithstanding commanding, circle of shareholders directing the BIS. For example, 
typical shareholder arrangements treat share repurchases as a significant organizational 
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action requiring majority approval. The majority deciding such matters for the world’s 
central bank is a mere 17 directors. 
 Authority for BIS operations rests with the Board of Directors (the Board). BIS 
statutes provide that at least 11 of the Board’s members are appointed by ex officio 
directors. The six ex officio directors are the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve accompanied by the Governors of the central banks of Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Board delegates 
considerable decision making authority to the Executive Committee. The Executive 
Committee, chaired by the General Manager, is thus accountable to the Board (BIS, 
2008, June 30). Hence the Board as well as the Executive Committee will be included for 
actor-level analysis. 
European Commission. The administration of the European Union is set forth in a 
number of treaties which establish the framework for three administrative bodies 
(EUROPA, 2008b). The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament 
jointly serve as representative governing bodies for the EU member nations with both 
judiciary and legislative authority. The European Commission (EC) acts as the main 
executive body with the right to pursue legislation as well as to monitor and enforce the 
implementation of enacted legislation (EUROPA, 2008a). In 2007 the EU administration 
proposed amendments to the EU Treaties (EU, C306, 2007). In particular the 
amendments established a united European Capital Market subsequently bound not only 
by national but also international standard setting agencies. Further they permitted the EC 
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to enter into agreements on behalf of its member nations (EU, C306, 2007). Effectively 
the powers of the EC were extended creating, “a single legal personality for the Union” 
EUROPA, 2008c, section 4, para. 1) in order to, “strengthen the Union’s negotiating 
power, making it more efficient on the world stage and a more visible partner for third 
countries and international organizations” (EUROPA, 2008c, Section 4, para. 1). In this 
the EC is noted to, “enjoy a substantial degree of independence in exercising its powers” 
(EUROPA, 2008b, Section 3, para. 3). 
Much of the advisory work on unification of EU national regulators as well as 
their collective commitment to NGO regulation falls within the EC’s advisory 
commission on civil society or the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC, 
2008). The civil society framework is intended to unite EU policies and efforts given the 
arduous history between many EU countries, their cultural and geographic diversity as 
well as the divergent positions of national governments and parliaments (EC, 2008). To 
bridge such gaps, or perhaps to expand traditional membership criteria, the EESC is 
reported to represent Europe’s socio-occupational groups and other interest groups such 
as international regulatory bodies. The EESC consists of 344 representatives nominated 
by national governments and appointed by the Council of the European Union. 
Membership is heavily slanted toward Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
each allowed 24 representatives—approximately 28% membership. The next highest 
allotments are 21 members each for Spain and Poland. In sum, these countries represent 
40% of the EESC’s member population (EESC, 2008). 
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The ECO Section operates within the EESC’s field of Economic and Monetary 
Union. Specifically the ECO Section, “covers coordination of economic and monetary 
policy, broad economic policy guidelines, stability and growth impact, enlargement of the 
euro zone, and other issues relating to economic governance” (EESC, 2008, ECO 
Section: Presentation). The ECO Section acts as a tireless mouthpiece for promoting the 
EESC’s guidance on co-regulation toward a single European market (EESC, 2004; 
EESC, 2005; EESC, 2008). More importantly Rule 29(2) of Rules of Proceedures—2006 
as amended—provide near carte blanche authority for the ECO Section, or any EESC 
committee for that matter, to deliver so-called own-initiative opinions on “…any question 
pertaining to the European Union, its policies and their possible developments” (EESC, 
2006b, p. 25). 
The EC takes actions on EESC committee opinions and reports on such actions. 
The EESC (2006a) boasts that more than two-thirds of EESC opinions are shown “due 
regard [and]…their influence often goes beyond the limited scope of the Commission’s 
proposal being examined in a Committee opinion” (No. 7). This is an apparent reference 
to the power of own-initiative opinions—approximately 15% of EESC’s (2006a) 
opinions in 2006. It appears that EESC opinions receive particular attention and regard by 
EU regulators (EUROPA, 2008a). Thus the EESC, in particular the ECO Section, 
provides explicate oversight to the IASB as well as express influence over EU regulators. 
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International Association of Insurance Supervisors.  The International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) was established in 1994 to promote an international 
framework for the regulation of financial insurance markets. Like the IASB, the IAIS 
(2005a) develops standards and guidance for the insurance markets as well as, 
“…encourages the implementation and practical application” (p. 1). At present the IAIS 
boost membership from over 190 jurisdictions in nearly 140 countries (IAIS, 2007). 
The IAIS promulgates supervisory papers to create standardized supervisory 
regimes for a global insurance market (IAIS, 2007, p. ii). This culminates into a three tier 
solvency structure. Level 1 is the preconditions of solvency assessment including risk 
assessment and management; financial valuation and reporting, and; setting regulatory 
requirements. The structural elements in Level II are concerned with developing 
governmental regimes for implementation of IAIS standards at the national level. It goes 
to follow that governmental monitoring as well as public disclosure to ensure compliance 
are structural elements at Level III (IAIS, 2005b). In sum, the IAIS prescribes in finite 
detail the overarching principles of insurance; a professional code of conduct; risk 
assignment methodologies and mandatory testing procedures; obligatory transaction 
analytics; institutional capital requirements as well as; financial reporting and disclosure 
requirements (IAIS, 2008). 
Officially the IAIS is organized as a legally separate nonprofit organization 
domiciled in Basel, Switzerland (IAIS, 2005a). Upon evaluation of financial and 
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operational viability; however, it appears that the IAIS operates as a legally separated 
committee for the BIS. These ties to the BIS, albeit significant, are obscured at best. For 
example, the IAIS was reorganized as a BIS hosted-organization in 1998 when its 
physical operations and financial viability were assumed by the BIS (BIS, 2008). 
According to the 2001 annual financial report the Swiss government provided over 
$350,000 in financing to relocate IAIS headquarters from Washington, DC to the BIS 
compound in Basel (IAIS, 2002).  
Actually IAIS activities prior to the 1998 relocation are speculative. The first 
publically available IAIS annual financial report is for the 2000 fiscal year in which 
revenues are reported to be just over $1 million. Per the 2000 annual report the IAIS 
subcommittees were not formally structured and/or operational (IAIS, 2001). This is 
contrasted with the 2006 annual financial reports in which reported revenue is in excess 
of $4 million and over 15 subcommittees and joint ventures reported vigorous and 
aggressive activity (IAIS, 2007). Considering this sudden increase in activity, the lack of 
financial disclosure, or public disclosure for that matter, by both the BIS and the IAIS is 
concerning. The value of BIS funding to the IAIS is vaguely addressed in the following 
financial statement disclosure: 
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4. BENEFITS RECEIVED 
The Association is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements, Basel, and 
benefits from administration, accounting, office space and other advisory services 
provided by the Bank for International Settlements. The Bank for International 
Settlements also administers a staff pension scheme of which a number of IAIS staff 
are entitled to membership. The Association also benefits from members' secondment 
of staff to its Secretariat. The total amount of the above benefits has not been 
determined. 
(IAIS, 2007, p. 21) 
 
 Lack of transparency should not be confused with lack of regulatory power as the 
IAIS promulgates the international standards for insurance supervisory regimes. In so far 
as accounting standard affect such regimes, “the IAIS provides input to the International 
Accounting Standards (IASB) for its work on the international financial reporting 
standards most relevant to insurers, and is a member of the IASB’s Standards Advisory 
Council…” (IAIS, 2007, p. iv). The term input can be translated into monitoring once one 
considers the IAIS’s hierarchical position within the Monitoring Group (IAIS, 2007). 
Thus the IAIS as well as its executive committee were included for analysis. 
International Organization of Securities Commissions. The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSOC) is recognized as the international 
standard setter for securities markets” (IOSOC, 2008b, Historical Background). The 
IOSOC evolved from the inter-American regional association in 1983 when 11 securities 
regulators from the Americas ratified the transformation. International membership 
followed in 1984 when securities regulators from France, Indonesia, Korea, and the 
United Kingdom joined the IOSOC. At present IOSOC members represent over 90% of 
the world’s securities markets (IOSOC, 2008b).   
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 In 1998 the IOSOC published a comprehensive set of objectives and principles. 
This collection is meant to standardize stock market regulation. Standardization alone; 
however, falls short of good governance. To test whether member nations were in 
compliance a comprehensive measurement system was adopted in 2003 (IOSOC, 2008b, 
IOSOC Historical Background). Additionally, to pave the way for standardization as well 
as monitoring the IOSOC adopted a memorandum of understanding in 2002 (IOSOC, 
2008b). The memorandum of understanding provides mechanisms in which the IOSOC, 
“… can ensure compliance with, and enforcement of their securities and derivative laws 
and regulations” (Multilateral MOU, 2002, p. 2) or with IOSCO principles. Effectively 
the IOSOC principles set forth a standardized regulatory framework for securities and 
derivative markets in member nations. The measurement system is used to judge 
compliance with the prescribed principles as well as establish action plans to correct any 
deficiencies. And the memorandum of understanding allows nearly unlimited access to 
national data with which to enforce the former two agreements. 
 As in any case of global administration, creating a standardized regulatory 
environment among nation members with diverse governmental, regulatory, and political 
environments is challenging for the ISOCO. Like its sister regulators the ISOCO is 
achieving success through structural realignments and fruitful cooperative arrangements 
within an international regulatory network. Naturally this scheme hinges on the internal 
structure of the ISOCO itself. 
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 The ISOCO operated as a nonprofit organization domiciled in Canada until 2007 
when it relocated to Madrid, Spain where it operates under the Law 55/1999 (ISOCO, 
2008a). Ostensibly the President’s Committee, consisting of representative from all 
member and associate member regulatory agencies, is endowed with the powers to 
achieve ISOCO’s objectives. In effect these powers have been delegated to an Executive 
Committee of 20 appointed members which, “takes all decisions and undertakes all 
actions necessary or convenient to achieve the objectives of the ISOCO” (ISOCO, 2008a, 
p. 34). Thus the broad representation of over 100 members from as many countries 
purported by the President’s Committee is more or less diverted to the 20 members of the 
Executive Committee. 
 The ISOCO’s interest in accounting convergence stems from the standardization 
of accounting valuations usually set forth in accounting standards. The ISOCO has 
adopted an active role—legitimized through the Monitoring Group—in the 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of IFRSs by its member as well as 
potential member nations (ISOCO, 2008a). The ISOCO’s work is largely conducted 
under the auspices of two working committees; Technical Committee and Emerging 
Markets Committee both of which contribute to the functional area of disclosure and 
accounting. Actually, it appears that the work of such committees is as influential in the 
process of accounting convergence as the accounting standard setting boards themselves. 
Or, as stated in the ISOCO 2007 Annual Report (2008a): 
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The Technical Committee, via the standing committee, continues to be involved in 
monitoring and supporting the work of the international accounting standard setting 
bodies. These include the various projects being undertaken by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the work of IFAC´s International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) on clarifying the development of International 
Standards of Audit and the activities of other bodies including the International 
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) and the International Ethical 
Standards Board for Accountants. IOSCO believes that international audit standards 
that contribute to high quality audits are important for securities regulators and 
essential to maintaining investor confidence, so it continues to monitor the work by 
the IAASB on producing new updated standards. (p. 20) 
 
The ISOCO (2008a) committees have also been engaged to provide the in depth 
information necessary to mange a truly global finance network. Their research 
contributions focus on private equity in general and collective investment schemes in 
particular. The fruit of these labors is to dictate future accounting regulations. For this 
reason ISOCO as well as the members of the three aforementioned committees were 
included for analysis. 
World Bank. The World Bank is a parent organization to five subsidiary entities, 
which are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation, The 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International Center for 
Settlements and Disputes (ICSD). The IBRD and the IDA represent the most noteworthy 
subsidiaries through which the vast majority of World Bank’s funding transactions are 
conducted (World Bank, 2007).  
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The powers of the World Bank are expressly delegated to the Board of Governors 
which is the “senior decision-making” body (World Bank, 2008, About Section). The 
Board of Governors is comprised of a governor and an alternative governor from each of 
the 166 to185 member countries depending on the specific subsidiary—IBRD or IDA. 
This arrangement; however, is yet another illusion of proportionate voting power. In 
reality the World Bank’s bylaws reposition virtually all functional operational powers by 
delegation to a small group of executive directors appointed by the Board of Governors 
(World Bank, 2008).  
In essence the power of the Board of Governors is limited to maintaining the 
internal organizational structure of the World Bank such as admitting/suspending 
member countries, capital stock authorizations, amending official articles or bylaws, and 
organizational realignments. Of these responsibilities special privacy is given to 
structural alignments via organizational amendment. Amendments to the Bank’s Articles 
of Agreement require 85% majority of the total voting power. Given that the United 
States holds approximately 15% voting power any such structural realignments are 
susceptible to US veto power (World Bank, 2008). 
The Board of Governors appoints 24 executive directors to conduct and approve 
daily operations. Of the 24 directors, 5 are appointed by the countries with the largest 
number of shares—United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and France. The 
remaining 19 members are elected by the remaining member countries. The executive 
directors can be delineated into two respective boards by virtue of appointment or 
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election. Specifically the World Bank claims that, “the resident [5 appointed members] 
Board of Directors (the Board) represents the evolving prospective of member countries 
on the role of the bank as well as its operational experience” (World Bank, 2007, p. 6). 
All subsequent references are to the board which by implication is the resident 5 member 
board. The board is reported to, “consider and decides [sic] on the IBRD loan and 
guarantee proposals and IDA credit, grant, and guarantee proposals made by the Bank’s 
president” (World Bank, 2007, p. 6). The remaining executive directors fill the, as 
officially described, important role of guiding the general operations of the Bank (World 
Bank, 2007). Further the executive directors appoint officers responsible for daily 
management and decision making on the board’s behalf. Therefore, the 24 executive 
directors as well as the appointed senior officers were included for analysis (World Bank, 
2007). 
The International Accounting Regulators  
 A host of international NGOs influence accounting convergence including the 
establishment of IFRSs by the IASB. International financial reporting standards only 
represent the technical reporting framework of accounting convergence. The scope of 
accounting convergence is primarily achieved by three separate regulatory bodies. In 
addition to accounting standards promulgated by the ISAB, boards under the auspices of 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) promulgate standards on auditing, 
education, and ethical conduct. 
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Augmenting the hierarchical approach employed above, a lateral approach was 
also utilized to define the IASB’s governance network. The efficacy of any social 
network approach is the ability to fully model a phenomenon (Wasserman & Faust, 
1999). The phenomenon in question, accounting convergence, is co-regulated through 
three standard setting bodies—IASB, IAESB, and IAASB. Further the accounting 
profession itself is regulated by two additional standard setting bodies or the IESBA and 
the IPSAB. The relational properties of the decision making authorities of the lateral 
standard setting boards are also used to expand the social network and included for 
analysis. Interestingly the lateral standard setting boards were recently realigned the fall 
under the newly created international Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB). Hence the 
following lateral agencies were also included in the IASB’s governance network. 
Public Interest Oversight Board. Creation of the PIOB was forewarned by the 
FSF in 2004. According to the FSF (2004b), “during 2004 a Public Interest Oversight 
Board (PIOB) will be created by the IFAC Monitoring Group to oversee IFAC’s public 
interest activities…the early establishment of PIOB, including the selection of its 
members, is essential to fully implement the reforms” (p. 22). This statement is so 
uncomplicated that it needs no further explanation. 
Officially; however, the PIOB was formally founded by donations made by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Funding aside, the FSF (2005) reported 
that the PIOB was, “…the result of a collaborative effort by the international financial 
regulatory community” (p. 4). The mission of the PIOB is reported to be, “…to oversee 
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IFACs auditing and assurance, ethics, and education standard-setting activities as well as 
its Member Body Compliance Program” (PIOB, 2008a, Para. 2). The PIOB is granted 
authority to review and evaluate IFAC activities; to oversee and approve IFAC 
committee nominations; and to recommend IFAC action projects (PIOB, 2008a). Thus 
upon creation the PIOB effectively assumed authority of IFAC governance and 
membership. 
 The PIOB (2008b) has in their words “given final approval” to the “strategic 
plans” (p. 4) of two of the three international accounting standard setting bodies. 
Specifically the two boards mentioned are the IFAC boards responsible for International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs), IFAC Code of Ethics (the Code), and International 
Education Standards (IESs) (PIOB, 2008b, p. 4). Consequently these boards exert 
incredible influence over the whole of international accounting convergence as they 
regulate the professionals practicing accounting as well as the auditing process.  
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International Federation of Accountants. The IFAC claims to be the global 
regulator of the accounting profession (IFAC, 2008b). At a broad level the IFAC strives 
toward two overarching goals. Firstly, the IFAC polices the profession by maintaining 
standards on accounting education, professional certification, and ethical conduct. Such 
efforts are, according to the IFAC (2008b), for the creation of a worldwide accountancy 
profession. An international accounting system is highly dependent upon accounting 
professionals. Moreover, the IFAC is also responsible for promulgating international 
auditing standards. 
In 2007 the IFAC instituted a mass reorganization program aimed at clarifying 
the, “decision-making framework for those involved in IFAC’s governance and 
management structure” (IFAC, 2008a, Section 1). Much like the reorganizational efforts 
detailed above, the IFAC’s reorganization expressly commits the IFAC to the emerging 
governance network by infusing structural control mechanisms. In effect, the PIOB is 
granted oversight and approval authority for the IAESB, IAASB, IAESB as well as the 
IPSASB collectively known as “public interest activities” (IFAC Bylaws, 2006, Section 
9.1). Although board member nominations are made by the Nominating Committee, the 
PIOB has been granted the authority to approve all members (IFAC Bylaws, 2006, 
Section 10). As a result final control of the IFAC standard setting members is effectively 
assumed by the PIOB, who select from a pool of candidates proposed by the Nominating 
Committee (IFAC Nominating Committee, 2008). Therefore the IFAC and its standard 
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setting bodies are also indirectly controlled by the Mentoring Group. Accordingly, the 
IFAC and its composite board were included for analysis. 
Research Methods 
At present little scholarly research has been published systematically categorizing 
the organizational bodies involved with accounting convergence (Cooper & Robson, 
2006; Perry & Nolke, 2006). Consequently working with an isolated collection of 
mainstream variables or dominate methodological approach is inherently problematic. 
Upon reviewing the five qualitative traditions noted by Creswell (1998)—biography, 
grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenological study, and case study—only case study 
methodology is suitable to provide a holistic representation of the broader stakeholder 
groups to international accounting convergence. For example, phenomenology is well 
suited for an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon or event. In general a 
phenomenological study examines a phenomenon from the perspectives of the 
individuals or the collective meaning they ascribe to the phenomenon under study 
(Creswell, 1998). There are; however, two major drawbacks with the use of 
phenomenological study to achieve the present objectives. The first drawback is the 
troublesome critiques of Harley, Hardy and Alveeson noted by Conklin (2007). In 
particular, the various practices employed during the phenomenological reflective process 
are particularly susceptible to subversion and skeptism. The second drawback of a 
phenomenological design is also applicable to biographical and ethnographical research 
designs; namely, that the research objectives of these designs focus on individuals within 
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the event rather than the event itself. The research focus herein approached accounting 
convergence from an organizational or structural level verses an individual level.  
Case studies involve the study of a bounded system or case(s) (Creswell, 1998, p. 
61). Yin (2003) defined a case study as an empirical inquiry that, “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). It can be hardly 
argued that accounting convergence is a contemporary phenomenon (Kingsbury et al., 
2005). Likewise Yin’s (2003) second criterion is also satisfied as clear boundaries 
between the phenomenon—accounting convergence—and the context—stakeholders of 
global administrative law—are easily blurred. 
 Case study methodology can be employed to examine “contextual conditions” 
that are intimately related to the phenomenon (Yin, 2003, p. 13). In this way Yin 
described a case study methodology as an “all-encompassing” and “comprehensive 
research method” (p. 14). Furthermore, Yin expanded his definition of a case study to 
include data collection as well as data analysis components. The following components 
are also given by Yin. 
First, a case study, “copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points…” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). As noted 
in the background information, the IASB operates in an ambiguous milieu virtually free 
of traditional democratic controls (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 
2005b). Obviously this problem can be approached in multiple ways. To date a majority 
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of approaches are more theoretical (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Hopwood, 1994; 
Lehman, 2005b) or focused on specific relationships between variables (Aziz & McLeay, 
2007; Brown, 2004; Caramanis, 2002). It was theorized that a systematic concentration 
on structural aspects of the global regulators is necessary to illuminate the underlying 
network driving accounting convergence. Clearly this is a distinctive situation with 
multiple variables. 
 Second, a case study, “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion…” (Yin, 2003, p. 14). A key issue is the nature and 
type of evidence or data collected. Due to the inaccessible nature of the key participants, 
who characteristically hold elite positions in geographically dispersed locations 
internationally, evidence from existing data was preferable. Moreover no one data source, 
such as survey research or interviews, appeared to be sufficient to create a holistic 
contextual representation of the IASB’s governance network. In as much multiple sources 
of evidence collected from various types of existing data—organizational bylaws, 
incorporation articles, annual financial reports, press releases, minutes, reports, 
communiqués, and other administrative documentation—were necessary (Yin, 2003). 
 Finally a case study, “…benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003, p. 14). The entire milieu 
of the IASB is overly complex for more traditional sociological analysis. Currently social 
network analysis embedded within a case study may be the only framework capable of 
defining the underlying network of stakeholders (Jones et al., 1997; Laughlin, 1995; 
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Rowley, 1997). For example, Laughlin (1995) advocated the use of social network theory 
which is capable of mapping complex stakeholder relationships.  
Summary 
As demonstrated the IASB operates in an ambiguous global administrative space 
endowed with the international authority to promulgate regulation affecting a host of 
interested stakeholders. Consequently this arrangement benefits some stakeholders at the 
expense of other stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a). For example, 
Perry and Nolke (2006) found that the IASB was able to rapidly prescribe accounting 
standards with very little public debate or input. Although these findings are significant, 
the IASB is just a small, nonetheless integral, part of the larger international network.  
The IASB’s ability to resist stakeholder influence is a function of its relational ties 
within the global accounting governance network. To tease out the IASB’s governance 
network an ego-centric sampling procedure was employed above. During this process a 
rich layer of conceptual details was added for each organizational actor. As the IASB’s 
governance network has been sufficiently defined a case study research design utilizing 
available data is developed in the next chapter. The results are then presented in chapter 4 
and discussed in chapter 5. 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 To date mainstream accounting researchers have neglected social network theory 
as a viable method for studying the superstructural forces behind the international 
accounting regulators (Laughlin, 1999, 1995). An exception is Perry and Nolke’s (2005) 
social network analysis of the IFAC and the European Commission. Although researchers 
have successfully used social network methodology to explore international accounting 
professional service networks (Koza & Lewin, 1999) and similar methodology to study 
international accounting models (d’Arcy, 2007), these tool have not been fully utilized to 
study international accounting regulators directly. One aspect of these superstructural 
forces is the IASB’s governance network.  
 Jones et al. (1997) theorized that, “a phenomenon of the last 20 years has been the 
rapid rise of the network form of governance” (p. 911). Rowley (1997) posited that the 
structural characteristics of this governance network could be used to interpret and 
predict the, “…simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders” (p. 887). To fill this gap 
in accounting literature, a research design incorporating social network methodology is 
set forth below to define and describe the IASB’s governance network. 
Research Design 
A case study framework incorporating social network data analysis was adopted 
to explore and describe the IASB’s governance network. Specifically a holistic focus was 
used to bind the network governance structure of the IASB and to determine if social 
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mechanisms within the governance structure support this role (Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 
1997). These purposes are at once exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Thus, a 
pluralistic research design strategy was preferable to achieve these objectives.  
The objectives are suited for case study research design. In particular, case study 
methodology is increasingly used for exploratory and descriptive purposes such as this 
(Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). The IASB governance network was defined as the case 
under study. Additionally, all data collected within the case were existing data. As 
Singleton and Straits (2005) noted the abundance and variety of available data is only 
limited by the researcher’s imagination.  
Relying on existing data was preferable given the nature of this inquiry as well as 
the inaccessibility of key participants (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). For the latter it would 
be virtually impossible to interview or survey hundreds of high-level officials in a 
suitable timeframe. Beyond this; however, other research designs are not well suited for 
detecting network structure. The unit of analysis for survey research, for example, is 
typically the individual and not the organizational structure (Singleton & Straits, 2005). 
For the purposes of detecting network structure other field methods such as interviews 
and questionnaires are costly to administer and inefficient. Moreover, the well 
documented bias of these methods can be lessened by observing the organizational 
structure apart from the individual experience (Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 
1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
78 
 
 
 
Accordingly social network methodology corrects many of the palatable 
limitations of the aforementioned research designs. Doreian and Albert (1989) wrote that, 
“among the exciting aspects of contemporary social network analysis is the potential to 
combine quantitative and qualitative techniques in a complementary fashion” (p. 281). 
Moreover, White, Boorman, and Beiger (1976) wrote, “…that the presently existing, 
largely categorical descriptions of social structure have no solid theoretical grounding; 
furthermore network concepts may provide the only way to construct a theory of social 
structure” (p. 732). 
Traditional data analysis based upon accepted theoretical underpinning is also 
problematic. For example, P-A theory has considerable merit such as the ability to isolate 
and quantify singular interests. However, straightforward principal/agent relationships are 
methodologically problematic on many levels (Alam, 2006). Even P-A theory proponents 
such as Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) acknowledged the limitation of using P-A 
theory to render a larger network representation. The appropriateness of P-A theory is 
further troublesome as epistemological notions, such as complexity, gain scientific 
acceptance (Geyer, 2003; Rowley, 1997). Legitimacy theory, on the other hand, is more 
amendable to the emerging scientific notions of complexity. Yet, legitimacy theory is 
founded on normative judgments which detract from an objective empirical network 
rendering. In sum, positivistic approaches such as P-A theory impose the assumptions 
that this network is relevantly stable and situationally independent while institutional 
approaches such as legitimacy theory inject normative measures. Both of these 
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propositions were rejected here (Hoque, 2006). Obviously, empirically framing fluid 
governance networks purposefully created by majority stakeholders contravenes 
positivistic theoretical bounds and normative limitations (Alam, 2006; Hopper & Hoque, 
2006). 
It was accepted that social network methodology may present the only viable 
method for constructing a theory of social structure (White et al., 1976). More 
specifically, social network analysis was necessary to empirically construct and examine 
the IASB’s governance network (Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Social network tools provide a method of examining the 
underlying mechanisms of structuralization and professionalization commonly found in 
the field of accounting (Aziz & McLeay, 2007; Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 1999; 
Jones, Hesterly, Fadmoe-Lindquest, & Borgatti, 1998; Laughlin, 1995). The application 
of social network methodology holds great promise in that many of these mechanisms 
and structural arrangements are too complex for more traditional data analysis. Therefore, 
social network data analysis was used to analyze the data collected for this case study. 
For these reasons the use of case study methodology was cohesively coupled with 
social network analysis (Jones, et al, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1999). To refer to the 
appropriateness of this methodological marriage Koza and Lewin (1999) noted that this 
type of case satisfies the definition of a network; and the network the definition of a case 
(Yin, 2003). Moreover, the network was formally constituted and organized by official 
structural agreements usually in the form of incorporation documents. Thus, lucid 
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boundaries in terms of the case as well as the network structure were readily determinable 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 1995; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999; Yin, 2003). 
As defined in previous sections a social network, “…consists of a finite set or sets 
of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p. 
20). The entire governance network is therefore an aggregate of all actors or nodes. The 
specific organizational nodes and actor-level nodes were defined in chapter 2 and 
aggregated below. Essentially two views of the IASB’s governance networks were 
created—one containing organizational nodes and one containing actor nodes. Data 
pertaining to these views were transcribed into four datasets—one organizational dataset 
and three actor datasets. Unique datasets for each research question are advisable given 
the particularistic conclusions, measurements, requirements, and limitations of network 
analysis methodology (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
The network data were measured against four variables—one variable per dataset. 
The dataset containing the organizational actors were measured for the structural variable 
of authority. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) criteria for structuration was used to define 
authority. Specifically the presence of identifiable ties of authority, including decision 
making, monitoring, voting, or other such powers, resulted in a directional authority 
relationship.  
Two actor-level datasets were measured against the composition variables of 
professional affiliation and geographic location. Unlike structural variables which are 
concerned with the relationship between pairs of actors, composition variables measure 
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actor attributes (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As Wasserman and Faust colorfully 
described, “composition variables, or actor attribute variables, are of the standard social 
and behavioral science variety…” (p. 29, emphasis original). Thus the variables of 
professional affiliation and geographic location were examined to add further conceptual 
details to the IASB’s governance network. 
The fourth, and final, dataset measured the structural embeddedness of the 
individuals within the network. This type of dataset and measurement technique formed 
an affiliation network. The set of actors were measured against a set of events or 
organizations to which the set of actors belong (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Affiliation 
networks are expressly formulated to quantify the extent to which a subset of actors 
interact or overlap with other actors or its structural embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In this respect, affiliation networks emphasize the duality 
between actors and events. Duality implies not only that actors are linked to events but 
also that events are linked to the actors who constitute the event (Borgatti & Everett, 
1989; Burt, 1976, 1987; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
The theoretical motivation for studying affiliation networks is to understand the 
importance of individual memberships in collective activities. As early as the 1950s 
Simmel recognized that group affiliations were fundamental in defining an individual’s 
social identity (cited in Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As theoretical developments on 
affiliation networks progressed a common thread emerged; namely, the premise that 
actors interact through social events or settings to create an affective link among 
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individuals (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
Overlapping, comembership, co-affiliation are typically defined in terms of an 
actor and an event. For example, Gerlach (1992) examined the directorial interlocks of 
companies sending directors to other companies using a social network block modeling 
method. Gerlach’s study is unique in that interlocking was not restricted to a specific 
event as much as it was deemed a cumulative property of the director’s former roles. 
Given the particularistic nature of Gerlach’s study—Japanese cultural ties—as well as the 
study herein—complex global governance—this longitutidual conceptualization is fitting, 
perhaps necessary, to accurately portray isomorphic structuration (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983).  
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) suggested multiple techniques for analyzing 2-
mode networks such as singular value decomposition (SVD), factor analysis, and 
correspondence analysis. Although these methods can be successfully employed to 
describe 2-mode data they are not particularly suited for binary data (Borgatti & Everett, 
1997). Furthermore, these methods, also a form of matrix permutation analysis, do not, 
“…indicate the boundaries between, or membership in, any subgroups that might exist in 
the network” (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p. 287). For these reasons, these methods did 
not seem appropriate here and were not used. 
The theoretical notion of cohesive subgroups, based on the concepts of distance or 
density identify subgroupings or interconnectiveness within the larger organizational 
network, were also considered for the data analysis of dataset4 (Borgatti, 2004; Borgatti 
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et al., 1990; Everett & Borgatti, 1999, 1998; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). These methods 
include techniques such as clique, n-clique, k-plex, and lambda set analysis. As Moody 
and White (2003) wrote, “the ability to directly operationalize structural cohesion through 
social relations is one of the primary strengths of a relational concept of social cohesion” 
(p. 106).  
The limitations of these techniques are that 2-mode data must first be transposed 
into 1-mode data. In as much the methods used to examine cohesive subgroups are 
designed to be applied directly to the relational ties between actors set up in a 1-mode 
matrix. When 2-mode data is transposed into 1-mode data it captures the relationships 
between a subset of actors—based on actor and event—instead of direct ties between 
actors. As discussed below transforming 2-mode data in this way offers a proven method 
to study affiliation data. However, great care must be exercised when using transposed 2-
mode affiliation data and applying analytical techniques designed for 1-mode data. Due 
to issues in interpretation with these types of cohesive subgroup measures they were not 
used in the present study (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
It is important to note that 2-mode data is amendable to 1-mode analysis. 
Transforming the data into 1-mode data allows researchers to study the ties between 
actors and organizations, organizations and actors or both. This method is supported by 
Wasserman and Faust (1999) and is particularly effective when both relations are studied 
concurrently. To focus on the ties between actors and organizations the dataset can be 
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transposed into a 1-mode comembership matrix. Conversely, to focus on the ties between 
organizations and actors the dataset can be transposed into a 1-mode co-organizational 
matrix. Incidentally these matrixes can be studied independently or concurrently; 
however, concurrent examination enables a more complete understanding of both modes 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In essence the product of transforming the data is a valued 
1-mode matrix for each mode—actor and organization—that can be analyzed. 
Accordingly, dataset4 was transposed to create a comembership overlap as well as a co-
organizational overlap matrix that was used to interpret various measurements of 
structural embeddedness. However, further processing—clique, n-clique, k-plex, and 
lambda set analysis—of these matrices is inherently problematic as discussed above. 
In sum, two social network techniques were applied to dataset4 to measure the 
structural embeddedness of the IASB’s governance network. Specifically, the two 
theoretical concepts appropriate to study affiliation networks were comembership overlap 
and co-organizational overlap.  
Population and Sampling Procedure 
The theoretical population under study is the IASB’s governance network. 
Governance networks are by definition, “…coordination characterized by informal social 
systems rather than by bureaucratic structures with firms and formal contractual 
relationships between them” (Jones et al., 1997). Obviously this definition is open to 
interpretation. Thus, an ego-centric sampling technique was employed in the previous 
chapter to (a) define the organizations bounded in the IASB’s network governance 
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structure, (b) detail the logical processes, and (c) provide conceptual richness to each of 
these organizations.  
An ego-centric (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) or ego-centered (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1999) network begins with a focal organization, the IASB in this case. Since the 
network population or boundaries are unknown, measurable ties to the focal organization 
were used to expand the network. Therefore, the relation of authority, defined as a 
variable above, was used to expand the network. To achieve a holistic approach alter or 
lateral connections based on organizational similarity to the IASB were also considered. 
Hanneman and Riddle noted that this technique is, “…useful for understanding how 
networks affect individuals [or focal organizations], and they also give a (incomplete) 
picture of the general texture of the network as a whole” (Ch. 1, Ego-centric networks 
section, para. 1).  
 When conceptualizing the relation of authority particular emphasis was given to 
formal interorganizational control mechanisms. These mechanisms were defined as 
formal structural agreements such as articles of organization, bylaws, and unilateral 
accords. It is hardly debatable that a network exists if it is evidenced by binding formal 
agreements (Jones et al., 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Furthermore, hierarchical 
arrangements characterize express authority. 
In the previous chapter the IASB’s governance network representing the 
population—indentifying the organizational actors as well as individual actors—was 
bound as the BIS, FSF, Mentoring Group, BCBS, European Commission, IAIS, IOSOC, 
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World Bank, ISAB, IFAC, PIOB, IAESB, IAASB, IESB, and IPSAB. Collectively these 
organizations represent the IASB’s governance network which is also the theoretical 
population. The individual actors (N = 407) were selected based on the criteria of internal 
decision making authority. In particular, these individuals included elite management as 
well as organizational board members. Individual members were not included for the 
European Commission or the Mentoring Group. Although the European Commission lists 
hundreds of members for numerous financial regulatory boards and advisory bodies it is 
uncertain how much authority these boards actually have to influence European law. 
Additionally, the Mentoring Group does not publish a list of individual members. The 
composition of individual actors within the governance network is detailed in Table 1 
below. 
87 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Detailed Listing of the Individual Actor Population 
 
Organization Committee No. of Members 
IASB TAAG 9 
IASB SAC 42 
IASB IASB Board 15 
IASB IASC Foundation 27 
IASB IFRIC 16 
IASB IASB Working Group 34 
World Bank WB Directors 24 
World Bank WB Officers 24 
Bank of International Settlements Board members 17 
Bank of International Settlements Executive Management 11 
Bank of International Settlements BCBS Members 22 
Financial Stability Forum FSF 27 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors  Executives 12 
Public Interest Oversight Board Board members 10 
International Organization of Securities Commissions Executive Directors 19 
International Federation of Accountants Board members 21 
International Federation of Accountants Nominating Committee 4 
International Federation of Accountants IAESB Board 19 
International Federation of Accountants IAASB Board 18 
International Federation of Accountants IESBA Board 18 
International Federation of Accountants IPSASB Board 18 
Total Individual Actors  407 
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The ego-centric selection of the boundaries of this social network is theoretically 
sound in that a priori populations are not specifically required (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claimed that networks, 
“cannot be determined a priori but must be defined on the basis of empirical 
investigation” (p. 148). 
Ego-centric sampling is complete when all relational ties have been exhausted or 
the theoretical population has been defined. The latter was the case here. Specifically, the 
selection of network nodes at the upper boundary of authority was halted at the BIS. The 
only quasi-organizational groups found to be higher in authority than the BIS were 
national finance ministers. Within the context of the BIS this authority is largely 
concentrated in the G7 or G10 countries. Consequently inclusion of these authorities 
forced inappropriate theoretical stretching of the relatively straightforward decision 
making criteria (Bonacich, 1987; Boorman & White, 1976; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
Therefore, the BIS was assumed to be the supreme, at least in terms of financial leverage 
and express hierarchical position, nongovernmental organization in the IASB’s 
governance network. The lower boundary constraint of the focal organization itself was 
supported by the decision making/authority criteria. Or, the IASB does not hold 
downward authority for any other organization within the scope of the governance 
network. Finally, the lateral boundaries were limited to other global accounting standard 
setting organizations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
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Data Collection Procedures 
To guide data collection efforts Yin’s (2003) embedded case study guidance for 
existing documentation analysis was followed. Existing data were used to define the 
network nodes as well as to reconstruct relational ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
Relying on existing data was preferable given the exploratory nature of this inquiry 
(Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). Existing data were also practical due to the inaccessible 
nature of the key participants, who characteristically hold elite positions in 
geographically dispersed locations internationally. A protocol for data collection 
procedures was implemented to foster repeatability and thus reliability and validity (Yin, 
2003). Therefore only existing data as defined by the protocol were analyzed.  
Data collection was guided by the data collection protocol presented in Table 2 
below: 
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Table 2  
Data Collection Protocol for Analytic Data Matrixes 
 
Purpose Data Collection 
 Dataset1 
Establish 
Organizational Actor 
Authority 
Main source: bylaws, incorporation articles, and annual financial 
reports. 
Secondary source: official organizational documentation including 
press releases, minutes, reports, communiqués, and other 
administrative documentation.  
 Dataset2, Dataset3, and Dataset4 
Establish Geographic 
Representation, 
Professional 
Affiliations, and 
Individual Actor 
Embeddedness 
Main source: bylaws, incorporation articles and annual financial 
reports, official organizational documentation including press 
releases, minutes, reports, communiqués, and other administrative 
documentation. 
Secondary source: non-administrative documentation including 
publically available dossiers and media sources. 
 
 
The data collected were transcribed to construct 4 datasets. Data pertaining to 
organizational actors were coded into dataset1 whereas data pertaining to individual actors 
were coded into dataset2, dataset3, and dataset4. All data collected were existing data from 
either the main or secondary sources listed in Table 1. Preference was given to main 
source documentation. Secondary sources were primarily used to validate main sources 
and to augment gaps found in main source data. Nevertheless, in some instances 
recordable data depended solely on secondary sources when such data were not reported 
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in main sources. This conditionality was particularly marked in the data collection for 
dataset2, dataset3, and dataset4. This data collection process should supplement the ties 
reported in main sources, creating more comprehensive datasets for analysis. 
Furthermore, such an approach mitigates the reliability bias of single source 
documentation (Yin, 2003).  
The organizational nodes (N = 15) were coded into dataset1 based on directional 
ties of identified authority. This resulted in a binary 15 x 15 adjacency matrix that is 
characteristically symmetric. Or, if the nodes are denoted as n1, n2, n3,…n15 the ith row is 
identical to the ith column—simply row 1 column 1 is (n1,n1). A directional tie of 
authority resulted in a binary code of 1 if present and 0 if absent.  
The actor-level nodes were coded into dataset2 (N = 401) and dataset3 (N = 407). 
Both datasets are asymmetric matrixes measuring the composition attributes of 
geographic representation and professional affiliations. Or, the rows represent the set of 
actors and the columns represent the measured attribute. The attribute of geographic 
representation was transcribed as the self or other reported nationality of the actor. The 
attribute of professional affiliation was coded into five professional perspectives. The 
professional perspectives were categorized as, (a) national regulatory agency, (b) 
accounting industry, (c) banking industry, (d) academia, and (e) other. A recordable event 
for dataset3 was defined as an actor’s concurrent or previous employment, board 
membership, committee memberships, or appointed positions in any of the 
aforementioned professional fields. A non-directional, binary value of 1—indicating 
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presence—and 0—indicating absence—was assigned. For example, if the organizational 
biography of actor included a prior appointment to a national securities exchange, 
employment with a banking institution, as well as a visiting professorship with a 
university, a binary code of 1 was transcribed into the national regulatory agency, 
banking industry, and academia columns. And a binary code of 0 was entered into the 
remaining two columns—accounting industry and other. 
Dataset4 also consists of the actor-level nodes (N = 407). Data collection for 
dataset4 was completed during a comprehensive review of main and secondary sources. 
In as much, these data were recorded as sources were systematically examined. This 
systematic examination included the following source data: (a) bylaws; (b) incorporation 
articles; (c) annual financial reports; (d) formal committee memberships; (e) ad hoc 
committee memberships; (f) select meeting minutes; (g) select reports; (h) selected press 
releases, communiqués or other administrative documents; and (i) non-administrative 
documentation.  
The completed dataset4 was an asymmetric matrix with the rows representing 
individual actors and the columns representing the affiliation variables defined as the 
organizations within the ISAB’s governance network. Furthermore, dataset4 was 
theoretically defined as an affiliation network. A recordable event was defined as an 
actor’s concurrent or previous board memberships, employment, committee 
memberships, appointed positions, or otherwise documented official tie with any specific 
organization within the governance network. A non-directional, binary value of 1—
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indicating presence—and 0—indicating absence—was assigned. To illustrate, a 
recordable relational tie between actor (a1) and a specific organization within the 
population (ith column) resulted in a coding of 1 in row a1, ith column. Multiple 
relational ties of actor (a1) resulted in a coding of 1 in each respective organizational 
column. For example, 3 organizational ties of a1 consisting of organizations 1, 2, and 3 
resulted in coding of 1 in row a1, columns ith1…ith3. 
Data Analysis 
Several factors were considered prior to selecting the methods used to analyze 
these network data. Of course, the selection of analytical techniques was dependent on 
the purposeful intent of the researcher. Social network theory underscores numerous 
levels of analysis by means of intricate mathematical notions. Moreover, these notions or 
mathematical theories are designed to achieve extremely particularistic ends (Burt, 1976, 
1972; Everett & Borgatti, 1999, 1998; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 
1999). Consequently, the analytical technique must be considered respective of the 
research objective. 
Datasets1 and datasets4 were entered into Borgatti et al., (2002) social network 
analysis software, Unicet and Cryam’s (2009) software, NetMiner. Much like traditional 
statistical packages—correlations or regressions—these software packages are 
programmed to perform the complex mathematical computations for innumerable types 
of network analysis. This, of course, can be a double-edge sword. As mentioned above 
network analysis is particularistic. In social network theory and methodology a wide 
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range of diverse methods have been developed for a broad range of empirical objectives. 
Thus, selecting the appropriate theoretical fit, network properties, set of nodes, types and 
attributes of relational ties, level of analysis, excreta was critical to the validity of the 
findings. On the other hand, if the aforementioned are carefully considered, the software 
virtually eliminates errors in the complex mathematical operations required for social 
network measurements. Additionally, internal validity was increased by the use of two 
software packages to replicate the data analysis. 
To achieve the objective presented in research question 1—presenting a holistic 
graphic representation of the IASB’s governance network structure—graph theoretic 
notion was employed. The data for dataset1 created a 1-mode network measuring the ties 
between the organizational actors within the governance network. The relational ties of 
authority coded in dataset1 were considered to be dichotomous, binary, and directional. 
Or, the ties themselves were not necessarily related to other ties and they were either 
present or not. Moreover, directional ties originate from one node to another node. At this 
level of analysis, dataset1 was used to produce a directed graph or digraph (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
In general, graphic theory is concerned with producing graphic representations of 
the structural ties linking social network data (Freeman, 2005). It is important to note that 
social network principles were not used to determine the spatial arrangement of the graph 
in this case. Or, the dataset was not tested for both cohesiveness and social role. Since 
directional ties were used to measure the relational tie of authority the resulting graph 
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produced a hierarchical view of the network focusing on the social role of each 
organization within the network (Freeman, 2005). For the purposes here emphasis was 
placed solely on social role in order to provide a more traditional graphic view of the 
governance network instead of the overly complicated social and spatial view offered by 
more complex graphic techniques (Freeman, 2005; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) 
Dataset2 corresponds to research question 2—what geographic locations are 
represented in the IASB’s governance network. Dataset3 corresponds to research question 
3—what professional perspectives are represented in the IASB’s governance network. 
These datasets were analyzed as attribute data for the individual actors within the 
network. Accordingly, analysis of such data does not require social network 
methodology. Instead traditional mathematical methods were employed to meet these 
research objectives. The inclusion of supplementary analysis of the network data was 
intended to address the more descriptive aspects or actor-level properties within the 
network structure. Therefore analyzing the characteristics of the network’s actors 
provided an empirical method by which conceptual details were ascribed to the 
governance network.  
Dataset4 was tested for the extent in which actor-level nodes were structurally 
embedded within the governance network. Structural embeddedness is defined by Jones 
et al. (1997) as, “…a function of how many participants interact with one another, or how 
likely future interactions are among participates, and how likely participants are to talk 
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about these interactions” (p. 924). The question becomes; how is the above definition of 
structural embeddedness derived from network analytics to achieve the objective herein?  
Of course, as discussed above, the type of data or network is as important as the 
property measured when selecting the appropriate methodological tools. The IASB’s 
governance network is an affiliation network. Or, unlike traditional network data that 
focus on the ties between actors, an affiliation network is concerned with the ties between 
a set of actors and a set of events. Wasserman and Faust (1999) defined the properties of 
affiliation networks as: 
• Affiliation networks are two-mode networks 
• Affiliation networks consist of subset of actors, rather than simply pairs of actors 
• Connections among members of one of the modes are based on linkages 
established through the second mode 
• Affiliation networks allow one to study the dual perspectives of the actors and the 
events 
(Wasserman & Faust, pp. 291-292, bullets original) 
 
The IASB’s governance network is a 2-mode network. Recall that a 2-mode 
network measures the relations or linkages between actors and events. Moreover, data 
analysis for this network is intended to measure the actor’s affiliation variable—
comembership or structural embeddedness—to the organizations within the network. 
This produces a subset of actors for each event which is consistent with the second 
network mode (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Hanneman and Riddle (2005) deemed this 
macro-level analysis. They wrote, “two-mode data offer some very interesting analytic 
possibilities for gaining greater understanding of ‘macro-micro’” relations (Ch. 17, 
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Introduction section). Specifically, the comembership overlap and co-organizational 
overlap for dataset4 were measured.  
The affiliation network was transformed into a 1-mode comembership network 
and a 1-mode co-organizational overlap matrix. In the original 2-mode affiliation dataset 
a tie between an actor and an organization resulted in a binary code of 1 in the actor row, 
organizational column. Two actors were considered to be affiliated with the same 
organization if both actors had a 1 in the same organizational column. The result was an 
asymmetric 407 x 10, 2-mode network which was used to derive a 1-mode comembership 
overlap matrix and the 1-mode co-organizational overlap matrix. 
The comembership overlap matrix considers the number of organizational 
comemberships shared by the individual actors. The number of times that 2 actors have a 
1 in corresponding columns gives the number of events they have in common. These 
comembership frequencies were transformed into an actor-by-actor matrix by recording 
the number of organizations to which the actors jointly belong. Summing relations of the 
actors to each organization resulted in a 407 x 407 symmetric sociomatrix with valued 
relationships. The values assigned to each actor can range from 0 to 10. If an actor was 
not affiliated with an organization a 0 was assigned. If an actor was affiliated with all 
organizations, the maximum value of 10 was assigned (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).  
 The co-organizational overlap matrix considered the pairs of organizations shared 
by 2 actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The organization overlap matrix was created by 
transposing the original 407 x 10 dataset into a 10 x 10 sociomatrix. Theoretically this 
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matrix is defined as an event overlap matrix or in this case an organizational overlap 
matrix. The transformation displayed the actor’s participation rates in an organization-by-
organization matrix which recorded the number of actors that each pair of organizations 
shares. Or, as the name implies it measured the degree of organizational overlap among 
the actors. Like the comembership matrix above, the resulting co-organizational matrix 
was a 1-mode, symmetric, valued sociomatrix (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). These results 
are presented in chapter 4 and discussed in chapter 5. 
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Introduction 
In this section the results from an empirical examination of the research questions 
are presented. As stated in previous sections examining the structural properties of the 
organizational as well as individual actors within the IASB’s governance network 
provides an opportunity to contextually analyze the relational qualities of multiple 
stakeholders while offering insights into the potential impacts of such arrangements 
(Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). This empirical examination focused on four properties 
of the IASB’s governance network; namely, which organizations constitute the IASB’s 
governance network, what geographic locations are represented within the governance 
network, what professional affiliations are present within the governance network, and to 
what extent is the governance network structurally embedded. 
The abovementioned properties correspond to the four research questions 
proposed in chapter 1. The following results are organized by research question. First, the 
research question is stated. A summary of the substantial findings follows each question. 
Finally, an in depth discussion of these findings is advanced in chapter 5. A reference 
guide to the acronyms used extensively in the following chapters is provided in Appendix 
1. 
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Results 
Research Question 1: Which organizations constitute the IASB’s governance network 
when defined in terms of social network theory and how are these organizations 
hierarchically arranged? 
Although additional graphic representations follow, the first portrayal of the IASB’s 
network governance structure is a straightforward, holistic visualization. Figure 4 below 
provides a nonscaled visualization of the organizational ties within the network coded for 
authority. Each organizational node received a binary coding of 1 if a formal tie of 
authority was present. To illustrate the BIS hosts the BCBS, IAIS, and FSF creating an 
authoritative tie of both operational and financial viability as defined in previous sections. 
If the BIS is represented by the b column/row; the BCBS by the e column/row; the IAIS 
by the g column/row; and the FSF by the c column/row the resulting coding is notated as 
(b,e), (b,g), and (b,c) = 1. The resulting image is a simple, directed digraph of the 
hierarchical structure of dataset1. 
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Note: Graph created with NetMiner cited as Cryam, 2009. 
 
Figure 4: Nonscaled graph of IASB’s governance network illustrating directional ties of 
authority between organizational nodes. 
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A hierarchical organizational structure emerges based on the structural 
mechanisms set forth in chapter 2. The Mentoring Group assumes the most striking 
network position as an apparent intermediary authority over virtually every aspect—
general standards, auditing, and professional standards—of international accounting 
regulation. This is not surprising given the Mentoring Group’s vague emergence in the 
arena of global governance. Beyond ambiguous references by other organizations very 
little is known and/or published about the Mentoring Group.  
The more noteworthy position is that of the BIS, namely that the Mentoring 
Group is comprised of 6 organizations, 3 of which are organizations hosted by the BIS. It 
could be further argued that the IOSOC receives its organizational legitimacy, in large 
part, from the BIS, IMF, and World Bank. Although this position is not reflected above 
since only formalized ties of authority within the accounting regulation network were 
included, international regulation of financial markets by global administrators is heavily 
dependent on some form of national legitimacy (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b).  
Research Question 2: What professional perspectives are represented by the 
individual actors within the IASB’s governance network?  
A total of 703 professional ties were found among the 407 actors in dataset2. As 
illustrated in Table 3 below, the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network 
have the largest number of professional ties to banking with 216 closely followed by 201 
ties to national governmental regulators. The 155 professional ties to the public 
accounting industry ranked a distant third. At face value; however, this outcome was not 
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unanticipated given the organizational structure of the network. As noted above 4 of the 
Mentoring Group’s 6 organizational members represent the banking industry.  
 
Table 3  
Professional Ties of the Individual Actors within the IASB’s Governance Network 
 
  National        Public    
  
Regulator Banking Academia Business Accounting  Other 
International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) 48 68 18 29 60 13 
Public Interest Oversight Board 
(PIOB) 6 6 3 1 1 0 
International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) 19 14 14 17 92 3 
Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) 66 77 9 1 0 4 
World Bank 
32 48 4 3 2 10 
International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 11 0 0 0 0 1 
International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSOC) 19 3 0 1 0 0 
Total 201 216 48 52 155 31 
Percentage 29% 31% 7% 7% 22% 4% 
 
Note. Among the 407 individual actors total number of ties = 703. 
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The results from the subtotals of professional ties are more remarkable. When 
partitioned by organization the individual actors within the IASB have more ties to 
banking than public accounting with 68 and 60 respectively. Among the 36 members of 
the 2 boards, namely the TAAG and IASB Foundation, with the authority to approve 
IASB, SAC, and IFRIC board members 26 documented professional ties to banking were 
found compared to 5 professional ties to public accounting. This is the intuitive reverse of 
what one would expect from an accounting standard setting board. 
Another substantial result is not with the sheer number of ties per se but with the 
type of banking affiliations found in the primary and secondary source documentation. 
Clearly a member of the BIS or World Bank is assumed to have a professional tie to 
banking. However, the banking attribute was coded to include any reported tie to the 
banking industry including central banks, public banks, private banks, investment banks, 
and development banks. Within the banking industry a robust investment banking 
subcategory emerged. Table 4 below provides a summary of the investment banking 
subcategory. Of the 64 reported ties to investment banks 49 are for members of the IASB. 
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Table 4  
Professional Ties of Individual Actors to Investment Bank Subcategory 
    No. of  Organization 
Organization Role Actors Total 
International 
Accounting 
Standards 
Board (IASB) 
TAAG 4   
IASC Foundation 16   
Standard's Board 4   
SAC 11   
IFRIC 5   
Working Group 9   
IASB Total 49 
Public 
Interest 
Oversight 
Board (PIOB) 
Oversight Board 3 
  
PIOB Total 3 
International 
Federation 
of 
Accountants 
(IFAC) 
IFAC Board 3   
Nominating 
committee 2   
IAESB Board 1   
IESBA Board 1   
IFAC Total 7 
World Bank Directors 2   
World Bank Total 2 
Bank of 
International 
Settlements 
(BIS) 
Executive Board 2 
  
BIS Total 2 
International 
Organization 
of Securities 
Commissions 
(IOSOC) 
Executive Committee 1 
  
IOSOC Total 1 
Investment Bank Subcategory Total   64 
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Based on Brown’s (2004) study more professional ties to business were expected. 
Business only comprised 7% of the professional ties. An actor was assumed to have a 
professional tie to the business industry if the actor served in a high-level position for a 
public company or if the actor had a tie to the board of a public company. Of the 59 ties 
found to the business industry the majority were noted in the IASB. Twenty nine of the 
59 ties were by IASB members. Moreover, 89% of the ties to business were found within 
the two accounting standard setting bodies—the IASB and IFAC.  
Business ties of the members within the accounting standard setters are justifiable 
and consequently expected. International Financial Accounting Standards are primarily 
intended to regulate the business community. Thus input by business experts, one of the 
largest user groups, is essential to the standard setting process. According to these 
findings it appears that professional representation from business is rather low when 
compared to banking or national financial regulatory bodies. 
The professional ties to academia and other professional groups were rather 
disappointing with 7% and 4% respectively. Again the majority of these ties can be found 
within the IASB and IFAC. Interestingly nearly half or 20 of the ties to academia were 
instructors of economics and not accounting.  
Research Question 3: What geographic locations are represented by the individual 
actors within the IASB’s governance network? 
Dataset3 consisted of the reported geographic location for 401 of the 407 actors. 
Within the raw data set 6 of the 407 actors are reported as organizational observers or 
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participants in general. These 6 actors were included for the other research question since 
the organizational body represented was given. However, other specific information—
geographic location or biographies—about these observers was not provided. Given the 
lack of geographic information these 6 actors were removed from this dataset. In sum, 56 
geographic locations were reported in the total population.  
This seemingly diverse geographic representation is not proportionate however. 
As illustrated in Figure 5 below the United States and United Kingdom constitute a 
combined 28% of the total geographic representation with 18% and 10% representation 
respectively. Similarly the Western nations of the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Canada, and Italy comprise 51% of the overall representation. In fact, 
only the 10 nations as depicted in Figure 5 below held more than 3% of the total. The 
remaining 34% of other representation consists of 46 nations, 6 with 0.7% or 3 members, 
8 with 0.5% or 2 members and 21 with 0.2% or 1 member. 
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Figure 5: Percentages of geographic representation of individual actors for entire 
network. 
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In 2004 Brown found that only 3 of the 45 members of the SAC, none of the 13 
members of the IFRIC, and 1 of the 14 members of the IASB hailed from developing 
countries. Since Brown’s study; however, 8 of the 39 members of the SAC, 7 of the 21 
members of the IFRIC, and 1 member of the 15 members of the IASB hail from 
developing countries. Although the so-called Anglo-Saxon nations still retain over 50% 
representation of the 3 aforementioned boards, the increase of members from developing 
nations is marked.  
Research Question 4: To what extent are the strategic members of the IASB’s 
governance network structurally embedded as measured by relational ties such as co-
directorship, employment or board memberships? 
Dataset4 is a 2-mode, affiliation network. The first mode consists of the 407 
individual actors and the second mode represents 10 of the 15 organizational entities. 
Therefore the dataset forms an asymmetric 407 x 10 matrix recording the actor’s 
affiliation with any of the 10 organizations. The organizational actors are the BIS, World 
Bank, FSF, IAIS, IASB, PIOB, IOSOC, European Commission, BCBS, and the IFAC. 
Since the IAASB, IESBA, IESB, and IPSASP are boards controlled and organized solely 
by the IFAC the individual actors with an affiliation to these boards were coded to be 
affiliated with the IFAC. Additionally, the board membership for the Monitoring Group 
is not publically available. Therefore, the Monitoring Group could not be included as an 
organizational category which is rather unfortunate given the Mentoring Group’s position 
in the governance network. 
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Affiliation networks can be represented in matrix form or as a bipartite graph. 
Both representations are derived from the same data where the latter is in graphic form 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The bipartite graph for Dataset4 is shown in Figure 6 below.  
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Note: Created with NetMiner cited as Cryam, 2009. 
Figure 6: Scaled bipartite graph of the affiliation matrix. 
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Basic statistics to determine the distribution of ties in dataset4 were computed 
using NetMiner software. The mean number of ties, standard deviation from the mean 
number of ties, minimum number of ties, and maximum number of ties for the actors 
within the dataset were computed. As shown in Table 5 below the minimum number of 
actor ties or comembership links to an organizational node is 1. This finding is intuitive 
as the actors were automatically linked with the organizational board on which they 
served. The maximum links for a single actor was 4. Or, at least 1 actor has 
comembership ties to 4 of the 10 organizations. The mean number of ties was computed 
as the average number of ties for each of the 407 actors. The resulting mean of 1.464 
indicates that the average ties among the 407 actors are to 1.464 organizations. Or, on 
average each actor is tied to 1 to 2 organizations within the network. 
 
Table 5  
 
Distribution of Relational Ties for IASB Affiliation Network 
 
MEASURES VALUE 
MEAN 
STD.DEV. 
MIN. 
MAX. 
1.464 
0.707 
1 
4 
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This mean is consistent with the actual pattern of ties noted in the 407 x 10 
affiliation matrix. The total number of ties found was 596. Four actors had ties with 4 
organizations, 33 actors had ties with 3 organizations, 105 actors had ties with 2 
organizations, and 263 had ties with 1 organization. The actual distribution of ties also 
seems to explain the relatively high standard deviation of 0.707. 
The density of dataset4 was also examined. Density, as used here, is a measure of 
organizational adjacency and is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1999). Two organizations are considered adjacent if they are linked by at least 1 
common actor. For example, if none of the organizations are adjacent the value is 0, if 
half of the nodes are adjacent the value is 0.5, and if all of the nodes are adjacent the 
value is 1. The density for this network is 1. Thus, the network is considered a complete 
graph or all organizational nodes share at least 1 actor in common (Wasserman & Faust, 
1999). 
To measure the comembership relationships of the actors, dataset4 was transposed 
to derive a 1-mode, 407 x 407 comembership overlap matrix. Since this matrix is too 
large to be reproduced in its entirety a partial representation for the first 10 actors in the 
dataset is presented in Table 6 below. In general, matrices yields two sources of 
information, namely the diagonal and the off-diagonal values. The diagonal values, 
shaded in Table 6 below, give the total number of ties for the mode—organization or 
actor—under study. Since this is an actor-by-actor matrix the diagonal values give the 
total number of ties found for each actor. For example, the first diagonal entry for actor 1 
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indicates that actor 1 is linked to 1 of the 10 organizations included in the analysis. 
Accordingly actor 2—diagonial value in the row for actor 2, column actor 2—has a 
relational tie to 2 organizations, actor 3 has ties to 4 organizations, and so forth. The 
highest diagonal entries for the comembership matrix are 4. This confirms that the 
maximum number of comembership for an actor is with 4 of the organizations. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Partial Reproduction of IASB Comembership Overlap Matrix 
 
Actor 
1 
Actor 
2 
Actor 
3 
Actor 
4 
Actor 
5 
Actor 
6 
Actor 
7 
Actor 
8 
Actor 
9 
Actor 
10 
Actor 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actor 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actor 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 
Actor 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Actor 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actor 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actor 7 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Actor 8 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
Actor 9 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Actor 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 
Note. This matrix only reflects the first 10 actors within the database. The complete matrix is 407 x 407.
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The off-diagonal entries for the comembership overlap matrix, which is partial 
reproduced in Table 6 above, measure the number of organizations to which a pair of 
actors jointly belong (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Accordingly, the off-diagonal values, 
the unshaded values in Table 6 above, produce an actor-to-actor comparison of ties. For 
example, the value of 1 in the column for actor 1 and row for actor 2 indicates that actors 
1 and 2 are co-members of 1 organization. The value of 2 in the column for actor 3, row 
for actor 4 indicates that actors 3 and 4 have identical comembership to 2 organizations. 
In sum, every actor is compared with every other actor to produce the number of identical 
comemberships. 
The number of possible off-diagonal actor-to-actor connections in a 407 x 407 
matrix is 165,242. This value is calculated by taking all possible combinations 165,649 
(407 x 407) and removing the 407 diagonal entries. The off-diagonal entries range from 0 
to 3. Whereas, 0 indicates that the 2 actors share no comemberships and 3 indicates that 
they share 3 comemberships. A summary of the off-diagonal scores is presented in Table 
7 below.  
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Table 7 
 
Off-diagonal Values for Comembership Overlap Matrix 
 
No. of 
comemberships for 
pairs of actors 
No. of entries in 
matrix 
0 114,948 
1 46,976 
2 3,216 
3 102 
Total Possible 
Occurrences 165242 
 
 
In an unconnected network scores of 0 and 1 are expected. Zeros are expected for 
the actor-to-actor pairs across different organizations. Ones are expected for the actor-to-
actor pairs on the same organizational boards. For example, the 143 members selected 
from the various IASB boards will exhibit a pair wise score of 1 since they are all 
originally affiliated with the IASB. When compared with actors from other organizational 
boards the value for IASB actors should equal 0 unless the actors are co-members of both 
organizational boards. 
As illustrated in Table 7 above the number of actors with identical 
comemberships in 2 to 3 organizations within the IASB governance network is robust. 
For example, 3,216 occurrences for the value of 2 were found. Moreover, 102 instances 
of actors with 3 identical comemberships were found. According to the diagonal values 
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the actual rates of comembership for the affiliation matrix were determined to be 4 actors 
with ties to 4 organizations, 33 actors with ties to 3 organizations, 105 actors with ties to 
2 organizations, and 263 actors with ties to 1 organization. This off-diagonal analysis 
enhances the actual results by providing additional details about the rate of 
comembership. For example, the diagonal results state only that 33 actors had ties to 3 
organizations, not which organizations. When the diagonal and off-diagonal results are 
combined they suggest that not only did multiple actors have multiple ties but multiple 
actors had multiple pairs of identical ties. For example, 11 of the 33 actors not only had 3 
comembership ties, but the 3 ties were to the same group of organizations.  
To measure the number of organizations shared by each pair of actors dataset4 
was transposed to derive a 1-mode, 407 x 407 co-organizational overlap matrix 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The co-organizational overlap matrix is presented in Table 8 
below. 
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Table 8 
Values for IASB Co-organizational Overlap Matrix 
 
BIS WB FSF IAIS IASB PIOB IOSCO EU BCBS IFAC 
BIS 84 7 31 1 7 1 0 24 27 2 
WB 7 67 2 1 13 1 3 11 3 2 
FSF 31 2 31 0 2 0 0 6 4 0 
IAIS 1 1 0 15 1 1 1 0 0 1 
IASB 7 13 2 1 150 3 11 18 3 19 
PIOB 1 1 0 1 3 12 1 3 2 2 
IOSCO 0 3 0 1 11 1 34 4 0 4 
EU  24 11 6 0 18 3 4 57 6 10 
BCBS 27 3 4 0 3 2 0 6 29 2 
IFAC 2 2 0 1 19 2 4 10 2 117 
 
 
This matrix is calculated much like the comembership overlap matrix above. 
Instead of focusing on pairs of actors, the focus is on pairs of organizations. Or, if 2 
organizations have an actor in common in the original database both actors will have a 
binary 1 in the organizational column. This matrix counts the number of actors with 
recorded ties for each organization as well as the number of actors that had 2 or more 
organizations in common.  
The diagonal scores, the shaded values in Table 8, of the co-organizational 
overlap matrix indicate the total number of actors who were affiliated with the 
corresponding organization. At first glance it appears that the IASB has the most 
members with 150, which is necessarily true. However, such an interpretation does not 
consider that the number of actors representing each organization is not uniform. For 
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example, 4 IASB boards were included with a total of 143 actors, whereas no European 
Commission boards were included (see Table 1 on page 87). Instead, only the ties with 
the European Commission by the actors of the other boards were considered. 
Consequently, to interpret the diagonal values it is appropriate to normalize them by 
considering the number of actors from each board included in the study. This 
normalization is shown in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9 
 
Comparison of Diagonal Values for the Co-organizational Overlap Matrix to Actor 
Population 
 
  
Board 
Members 
Co-
Organizational 
Ties Difference 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 28 84 56 
World Bank (WB) 48 67 19 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 27 31 4 
International Assoc. of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) 12 15 3 
International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) 143 150 7 
Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) 10 12 2 
International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSOC) 19 34 15 
EU Commission (EU) 0 57 57 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) 22 29 7 
International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) 98 117 19 
Total 407 596 189 
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Table 9 accounts for the 407 automatic ties recorded for organizational boards to 
which the 407 actors were affiliated. The organizational overlap matrix shows that the 
407 actors had a total of 596 ties to the 10 organizations included in the study. As a result 
the 407 actors were found to have 189 additional ties to organizations other than the 
organizational board from which they were drawn. 
The largest degree of organizational overlap was found with the European 
Commission. This is not surprising considering that none of the board members from the 
European Commission were included in the original dataset. Therefore, each tie is 
automatically considered an organizational overlap tie. Nonetheless it is interesting to 
note that 57 of the 407 actors had relational ties to the European Commission although 
none of the original actors were drawn from these boards.  
The BIS ranked a close second. The study included 17 members of the BIS Board 
as well as 11 members of executive management for a total of 28 members. These 28 
members produced 84 organizational ties with the other organizational boards for a total 
increase of 56 co-organizational ties. Again, these results are not surprising considering 
the BCBS, the IAIS, and the FAF are technically considered BIS hosted organizations. 
However, these results do quantify the pervasiveness of BIS organizational overlap 
within the seemingly unrelated accounting standard setting network. 
The off-diagonal entries—unshaded values—found in Table 8 are also 
noteworthy. The off-diagonal entries record the instances of actor overlap between the 
organizations. The value of actor overlap for each organization ranges from 0, no pairs of 
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actors share membership, to 31, meaning that 31 actors share membership in these 
organizations. The FSF and BIS were found to have the greatest degree of actor overlap. 
This is expected given that the FSF is a BIS hosted organization. In fact, by examining 
the values found in the FSF row, it appears that the FSF has ties to the banking 
organizations—BIS, World Bank, BCBS—, the European Commission, and the IASB. 
Given the FSF’s mission to oversee stable financial markets it is questioned why the ties 
outside of banking extend only to the accounting regulators and not the other financial 
market regulators—the IAIS and the IOSOC. 
From the off-diagonal entries for the IASB presented in Table 8 it is evident the 
IASB board has co-organizational ties to every organization within the theoretical 
governance network. The values in the IASB row indicate the IASB shares 7 co-
organizational members with the BIS, 13 with the World Bank, 2 with the FSF, 1 with 
the IAIS, 3 with the PIOB, 11 with the IOSOC, 18 with the European Commission, 3 
with the BCBS, and 19 with the IFAC. In fact, the IASB is the only organization other 
than the World Bank to have comembership ties to all the organizations within the 
governance network. This may seem intuitive given that the focal node used to select the 
IASB governance network was the IASB. However, the theoretical connection between 
the IASB and the other organizations in the network is assumed to stop at the 
organizational level or the organizations may be connected based on lines of authority, 
but the individual members that constitute the organizational boards are assumed to be 
autonomous members of a specific organization. Therefore, it is apparent that the 
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members of the IASB board share considerable ties to every organization within the 
governance network.  
Summary of Findings 
First, an organizational view of the IASB’s governance network was created. 
From the nonscaled directed graph presented in Figure 4 it is evident that based on the 
ties of authority the IASB’s governance network forms a hierarchical structure with the 
Bank of International Settlements, World Bank, and Mentoring Group assuming 
important positions.  
Next, three attributes of the individual actors within the governance network were 
measured—geographic representation, professional ties, and structural embeddedness. 
Although over 50% of the actors represented Western nations the amount of geographic 
diversity in the overall network was greater than expected. In fact, the geographic 
diversity within the IASB since Brown’s (2004) study has increased considerably. 
As illustrated in Table 3 the individual actors within the IASB’s governance 
network have the largest number of professional ties to banking with 216 closely 
followed by 201 ties to national governmental regulators. The 155 professional ties to the 
public accounting industry ranked a distant third. This result mirrors the hierarchical 
structure of the governance network with banking organizations assuming the most 
prominent role. However, the relatively low number of ties to both the accounting and 
business industries were both unexpected and striking. 
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Network isomorphism was detected in the measures for structural embeddedness. 
For example, dataset4 exhibited a perfect score for density. Or, every organization in the 
governance network is connected by at least 1 actor. Furthermore, substantial results were 
found on the measures of comembership overlap and co-organizational overlap.  
Together the above results indicate that the IASB governance network is a 
definable hierarchy that exhibits striking qualities of professionalization and structural 
embeddedness. Rowley (1997) posited that, “as network density increases, the ability of a 
focal organization’s [IASB] stakeholders to constrain the organization’s actions 
increases” (p. 898). This indicates that in the face of divergent interests or continuous 
accounting standards the IASB’s prominent stakeholders, found to be primarily banking 
constituents, may have the ability to constrain the IASB’s action. These results are further 
interpreted and discussed in the next chapter.
  
 
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary 
This researcher aimed to define the IASB’s governance network as well as to add 
empirical details to this network. Based on social network theory the IASB’s governance 
network was defined as an affiliation network whereas the connections among the actors 
were based on their linkages to the organizations (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). To achieve 
these goals two views of the IASB’s governance network were captured. The first view 
was of the organizational actors and the second was of the individual actors holding 
positions of influence within the organizations. As such this work presents a concurrent 
analysis of the interplay between organizational actors and individual actors within the 
governance network. This focus was intended to emphasize the duality between events, 
organizations in this case, and actors common to the study of affiliation networks 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). 
The IASB governance network was defined using an ego-centric sampling 
technique. This technique yielded 15 organizations to be included in the network based 
on identifiable ties of authority. These organizations were briefly discussed and the 
individual actors endowed with decision making authority within each organization were 
identified. This effort contributes the first theoretical definition of the IASB’s governance 
network in scholarly literature. 
Beyond the formal organizational structure of the IASB’s governance network, 
attributes of the individual actors holding elite positions were examined. The professional 
affiliations, geographic representation, and structural embeddedness of these actors were 
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analyzed. These variables are theorized to enhance the macroculture of the governance 
network. Macroculture is defined by Jones et al. (1997) as, “…a system of widely shared 
assumptions and values, comprising industry-specific, occupational, or professional 
knowledge, that guide actions and create typical behavior patterns among independent 
entities” (929). Specifically, the authors suggested that the more concentrated the 
macroculture variable the more likely the network will assume certain, “values, 
assumptions, and rule understandings” (p. 929).  
Macroculture parallels DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of 
professionalization as a process of normative isomorphism. Specifically, they asserted 
that filtering was an important mechanism used to achieve professionalization. Filtering 
is achieved by appointing individuals with similar credentials, experiences, connections, 
and professional affiliations. Moreover, DiMaggio and Powell hypothesized that the 
greater the dependence on an organization by another organization the more similar it 
will become to that organization or the higher the level of isomorphism.  
Conclusions 
Prior to discussing these results it is important to emphasize that empirical 
boundaries were not ascribed to these findings. Instead the purposes here are exploratory 
and descriptive rather than statistical. In this manner the general focus when studying 
affiliation networks is in interpretation rather than empirical predication (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1999). Therefore, in this section the conclusions for each research question are 
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provided. A detailed interpretative analysis of the data presented in chapter 4 is discussed 
in the following section. 
The intent of the first research question was to determine which organizations 
constituted the IASB’s governance network and to examine how these organizations were 
hierarchically arranged. The underlying theoretical considerations for this question were 
to determine if a governance network existed in terms of social network theory and to 
examine the governance network in terms of its organizational authority. First, it was 
concluded that a discernible governance network does exist. Every organization within 
the governance network is bound by formal and informal lines of authority (Jones et al., 
1997). Second, banking institutions—Bank of International Settlements and World 
Bank—hold the most influential positions of authority within this governance network. In 
terms of organizational authority (Jones et al., 1997), structural properties (Rowley, 
1997), and operational viability (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b) these banking institutions can 
exert substantial influence to ensure that their interests are secured in the arena of 
international financial reporting standards. 
The second research question was crafted to examine the professional 
perspectives represented by the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network. 
This concept of professionalization can have a profound impact on the nature and 
direction of accounting regulation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Again, ties to the banking 
industry were found. The individual actors exhibited more ties to the banking profession 
than any other category. Professional ties to banking comprised 31% of the total ties 
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found. In fact, the accounting industry ranked a distant third with 22% of the total ties. 
The more concerning finding; however, was the type of banking ties noted. A robust 
investment bank subcategory emerged with 64 reported professional ties, 49 of which 
were professional ties of the IASB members directly. In fact, more ties were found to the 
investment banking subcategory than to academia, business, and other groups which 
included labor unions, environmental, social, and other interest groups not captured in 
another category with 48 ties, 52 ties, and 31 ties respectively.  
Although professional ties to national regulators—national regulatory interests—, 
the accounting industry—subject matter expertise—, business industry—largest user 
group applying the standards—, and even banking in general given the composition of 
the governance network can be justified, the pervasiveness of investment banking ties is 
highly suspect. This leads to two conclusions. First, when professionalization and 
structural embeddedness are considered as criteria for safeguarding and coordinating 
exchanges, the banking industry has the most dominate macroculture in this population 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jones et al., 1997). Second, representation by investment 
banking interests, which are strictly profit motivated, is more embedded within the 
governance network than any other academic, social, or environmental group. Such 
representation is also considered a structural mechanism through which the banking 
industry can influence the international accounting regulators.  
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The geographic representation of the individual actors within the IASB’s 
governance network was the focus of the third research question. The Western nations of 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States have majority 
representation in the governance network. In fact, 51% of the representation is shared by 
the these six Western nations whereas the remaining 49% is sparsely distributed among 
56 nations. Accordingly, strong Western influence over the shaping of international 
accounting regulations is certainly concluded. However, a considerable increase in 
geographic representation was noted when the IASB’s governance network was 
considered as a whole. 
The final research question was intended to determine the extent to which the 
individual actors of the IASB’s governance network were structurally embedded as 
measured by relational ties such as co-directorship, employment, or board memberships. 
Structural embeddedness is another mechanism used to safeguard exchanges and exercise 
control within an inter-organizational network (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Granovetter, 
1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). The existence of structural embeddedness was 
supported by the statistical properties of the affiliation matrix, as well as by the values 
rendered in the comembership overlap matrix and co-organizational overlap matrix. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that the IASB’s governance network is a considerably 
structurally embedded network as the individual members have considerable 
comembership ties to multiple organizations. Furthermore, the findings of the co-
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organizational overlap analysis exhibits similar patterns of control as representatives from 
the Bank of International Settlements had the most co-organizational ties.  
 
Interpretative Analysis of Data 
In line with the conclusions above, a detailed analysis of the data is presented 
below to further address the implications of each research question. Research questions 1 
through 4 are presented in terms of organizational authority, professional affiliations, 
geographic representation, and structural embeddedness respectively. It should also be 
mentioned that too much embeddedness is not necessarily desirable. Overly embedded 
networks are inherently problematic (Granovetter, 1973; Jones et al., 1997). 
Consequently, an intermediate view is adopted where notable findings based on proven 
interpretations are discussed. 
Organizational Authority 
The IASB governance network as defined herein is not an unconnected network. 
The network exhibits perfect density which indicates that each organization is connected 
to every other organization by virtue of authority. Going back to the concept of 
operational viability it is assumed that the IASB will serve the interest of the entities 
providing such viability at the expense of other stakeholders when such interests diverge. 
It is evident based on ties of authority that the organizations theoretically defined as the 
IASB’s governance network form somewhat of a hierarchical structure. While the 
hierarchical view is probably more identifiable, the complex web of authoritative 
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agreements more closely resembles a form of network hierarchy and not a traditional 
organizational hierarchy (Jones, et. al, 1997).  
This graphic representation also renders the recent creation of the Mentoring 
Group suspect from a network perspective. It appears that the Mentoring Group serves as 
a specialize intermediary to represent the interest of higher-level organizations within the 
network hierarchy, most notably the BIS. Clearly the financial as well as operational 
viability of the Mentoring Group rests with the BIS, which also represents the highest 
level of authority in the governance network. Granovetter (1992) noted this type of 
coupling in the Chinese social structure where the product organizations are, “…highly 
cohesive groups that are sharply delimited from one another; thus trust is available but 
non-economic claims are illegitimate beyond these group boundaries” (p. 7). Or, the 
formation of a legally separate entity creates the illusion of independence in appearance 
but allows for the host organization to wield its influence.  
However, great care must be employed in interpreting the impetus behind a new 
organizational body (Hopwood, 1994). Although the rationale for the creation of the 
Mentoring Group is not supported as an empirical fact in the present study, it can be 
theorized as a structural mechanism created for the purpose of safeguarding exchanges 
between the BIS and the IASB (Granovetter, 1992; Jones, et. al, 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
This would be an interesting point for future research. 
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Loft, Humphrey, and Turley (2006) drew on the embedded global influence of the 
IFAC to conclude that the regulation of the accounting profession—via the IFAC—is 
reconfiguring itself at the global level through a web of complex interorganizational 
relationships. This interorganizational web forms what they deemed a “world financial 
authority” (p. 444). This same web of organizational relationships was replicated herein 
for both the IFAC as well as the IASB. Specifically, Loft et al. noted that the interests of 
the global financial regulators, the IAIS, BIS, World Bank, and IOSOC to name a few, is 
embedded into the regulatory process by virtue of the oversight provided by the 
Mentoring Group. Figure 4 on page 101 illustrates that these same global institutions also 
provide direct oversight to the IASB. Thus, it could be concluded that a discernible global 
financial infrastructure exists.  
Considering these results it is difficult to dismiss the notion of an intentional 
arrangement that constitutes what could qualify as a global financial infrastructure. 
Moreover, when considering significant global financial relationships this global 
financial infrastructure should be detected if the scope is broad enough. For example, on 
a global level the IOSOC regulates national securities exchanges, the IASI regulates 
insurance transactions, the IFAC regulates the accounting profession, and the ISAB 
regulates accounting standards. When these functions are overseen by the world’s 
banking authorities, the BIS and World Bank, a global financial infrastructure is virtually 
perfected. 
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Influences over this global financial infrastructure do not seem haphazard. 
Immediately two implications of such an arrangement bear mention. First, since this 
infrastructure or network is dominated by stakeholders concerned almost exclusively with 
financial market operation competing interests that are less operational and more social in 
nature may be either intentionally or unintentionally dismissed. The second consideration 
is whether other interest groups can gain reasonable access to this global financial 
infrastructure. 
Professional Affiliations 
The findings for this variable seem to support a deductible macroculture and 
underlying level of professionalization within the IASB’s governance network. The most 
direct representation of professionalization can be found in the professional affiliations 
for the individual actors as well as the relational ties among the actors. It does not seem to 
be a consequence that organizations from the banking industry represent the highest level 
of the hierarchy and that the most professional ties were found to the banking industry. 
Since the actors within the banking industry were coded to have a professional tie to 
banking this attribute was expected for these organizations. However, when partitioned 
by organization the individual actors within the IASB were found to have more ties to 
banking than to public accounting. Most notable were the ties detected in the boards with 
the authority to appoint all other IASB members. Within these boards 26 documented 
professional ties to banking were found compared to 5 professional ties to public 
accounting.  
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These results are further confounded when the banking category is delineated into 
subcategories separating ties as belonging to central banks, public banks, private banks, 
investment banks, and development banks. The number of ties within the IASB for 
investment banks is only surpassed by the professional ties to the accounting industry. 
Whereas professional ties to the accounting industry were expected, a notable number of 
professional ties to investment banks were not. One reason that accounting regulation is 
delegated to non-governmental organizations is to capitalize on private party accounting 
expertise (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a). Deductively, a private body accounting regulator must 
retain the expertise of experienced accountants. As Mattli and Buthe (2005a) noted an 
accounting regulator needs, “…general accounting expertise, familiarity with existing 
financial instruments, and knowledge of current practices in order to be able to write an 
accounting standard that is feasible in implementation as well as effecting in achieving 
the goals [of accounting]…” (p. 405). Based on these criteria alone the overwhelming 
number of professional ties to investment banking is not intended to achieve the goals of 
producing high quality accounting standards, which serve a broad range of interests. 
Although the necessity for professional ties to accounting is not debated, the necessity for 
professional ties to investments banks; however, is clearly questionable. 
Furthermore, these findings support Perry and Nolke’s (2006) conclusion that 
political influences on the IASB have morphed from those of business to those of 
finance, as well as their previous findings in which Perry and Nolke (2005) used social 
network analysis to examine the various committees of the IASB and the European 
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Financial Reporting Advisory Group. In particular, they found that, “…financial sector 
actors wield substantially more influence than other categories of business actors within 
the governance of international accounting standard setting” (p. 1). Furthermore, they 
noted a robust investment banking subcategory, which was reproduced here. Interestingly 
they also found, “public actors have retreated and broad social constituencies are not 
represented at all” (p. 17). This shift from the political influence of the business industry 
to the financial industry does explain the results confirmed herein; especially the 
unexpectedly low ties to the business industry, who had long been cited by accounting 
scholars as controlling accounting regulation. 
Consistent with the network analysis of Perry and Nolke (2005), not one 
professional tie to unions or any other type of generalized labor interest were found 
herein. In regard to labor only the interests of executive and elite workers were 
represented within the network. In particular, ties categorized as other professions were 
found to Financial Executives International, Michael C. Fina Co., and Mitchell Notley & 
Associates. These groups specialize in executive compensation, recognition, and benefit 
packages. Therefore it seems that although general labor is not represented executive 
labor is. This is concerning since compensation related accounting regulation often 
conveys vast society implications (James, 2008; Perry & Nolke, 2005, 2006).  
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Geographic Diversity 
From a geographic perspective the Western nations of the U.S., U.K., Germany, 
France, Canada, and Italy comprise over 50% of the membership in the overall 
governance network as well as the IASB boards directly. Although this cannot be 
construed as Western control, it is an indication of Western influence of international 
accounting standards. It has been claimed that the IASB is dominated by a narrow band 
of Western, accounting experts (Brown, 2004). However, it should be noted that the 
majority of accounting experts with free capital market expertise is concentrated within 
the Anglo-Saxon countries (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b). Nonetheless, Brown (2004) noted, 
“…a structure with a more egalitarian approach, a structure claiming to have legitimacy 
based upon representativeness, would involve more representatives from the emerging 
countries” (p. 387). As detailed in the previous section a marked increase in the 
representatives from developing countries was noted within the IASB’s organizational 
structure. This increase; however, cannot be ascribed to the overall network since a 
benchmark for the network defined herein does not exist. For the IASB specifically such 
a longitudinal increase in geographic representation from developing nations is consistent 
with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory on institutional isomorphism that contends as 
organizations emerge in a given field, “powerful forces emerge that lead them to become 
more similar to one another” (p. 148). Or, the authoritative organizations for the IASB 
are similarly geographically dispersed and thus the IASB’s governance network would 
tend to follow this trend.  
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As Schaub (2005) noted the jurisdictions directly applying the accounting 
standards should be entitled to representation with the IASB network. This is not to say 
that the idyllic mix of representation is necessarily proportionate. However, issues arise 
when standards developed for mainly Anglo-Saxon financial markets are unilaterally 
applied to all nations committed to international financial reporting standards. In some 
instances—for example, the adoption of IAS 39 in the European Union—issues even 
arise amongst the Anglo-Saxon countries (Schaub, 2005). For example, Caramanis 
(2002) claimed that accounting convergence in Greece, consequently a free-market 
capitalist European nation, marginalized Greek accounting professionals in what he 
deemed to be, “…a complex system of superimposed, overlapping and often competing 
national and international agencies of governance” (p. 379). 
Although it is agreed that a truly global marketplace must be interpreted by a 
codified set of consistently applied accounting standards, it is questioned whether the 
economical and political interest of member nations should be assumed by standard 
setting bodies on which member nations have little to no representation (Schaub, 2005). 
For example, Geyer (1998) argued that the ability for nations to resist globalizing forces 
with adverse social or cultural implications is partially a function of active national 
lobbying against such forces. Herein; however, the case may not be as much for lobbying 
against accounting convergence as it is for active involvement in the standard setting 
process which undoubtedly affects national jurisdictions, each with a particular set of 
needs and circumstances.  
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Structural Embeddedness 
Affiliation networks are commonly utilized to study interlocking directorates or 
comemberships on organizational boards (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). This is one 
theoretical definition of structural embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992). Dataset4 was 
constructed as an affiliation network to study the interlocking directorates or 
comembership ties among the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network.  
Two characteristics of the comembership overlap and co-organizational overlap 
results were striking. First, the results from both matrixes indicate that the individual 
actors within this governance network are considerably structurally embedded. The actual 
rates of comembership for the affiliation matrix revealed that 142 of the 407 actors had 2 
or more comembership ties. This conclusion is supported in the co-organizational overlap 
matrix which showed189 additional ties to organizations other than the organizational 
boards from which the actors were drawn. In fact, the IASB board was shown to have co-
organizational ties to every organization within the governance network. Theoretically 
the governance network should be unconnected at the individual actor level even though 
formal mechanisms of oversight and authority exist at the organizational level.  
Second, the distribution of ties indicated a strong financial presence within the 
network. The highest instances of co-organizational ties were found in the European 
Commission with 57 ties. The BIS ranked a close second with 56. Again, these results are 
not surprising considering the BCBS, the IAIS, and the FAF are technically considered 
BIS hosted organizations. Moreover, other than the IASB the World Bank was the only 
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organization with comembership ties to all the organizations within the governance 
network.  
Jones et al. (1997) theorized that effective network governance mechanisms must 
strive to resolve problems of adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges (p. 
917). By synthesizing social network theory and transaction cost economics theory they 
posited that structural embeddedness is employed in network governance to enable social 
mechanisms to resolve the aforementioned problems. Consequently, such mechanisms 
likely enable the governance network to thrive even in rapidly changing markets. 
Moreover, Jones et al. theorized that, “the interaction of these social mechanisms in 
network governance may promote cooperative behavior while at the same time thwarting 
problems characterized as social dilemmas” (p. 933-934). 
These social network phenomena may, at least partially, explain the lack of 
procedural transparency and inclusion (Hopwood, 1994; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b; 
McCombie & Deo, 2005), multiple principal problem (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b), 
narrow membership (Brown, 2004; Caramanis, 2002; Hopwood, 1994), national 
legitimacy (Schmidt, 2002), regulatory fairness in the face of diverging interest (Chand & 
White, 2007), and the influence of international organizations (Caramanis, 2002; Graham 
& Neu, 2003; Lehman, 2005) previously noted with international accounting regulation. 
In other words intentional structural embeddedness in network governance may manifest 
as unbalanced, isolated cliques in which information is tightly controlled by seeming in-
member factions (Jones et al., 1997; Granovetter, 1992). Faerman et al. (1999) concluded 
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that this type of interorganizational cooperation was purposefully constructed in financial 
regulation as an informal means of centralized control. Moreover, it appears that these in 
member factions exercising this centralized control are heavily influenced by the 
financial industry. This would imply various consequences for a broad base of 
stakeholder groups. 
Recommendations for Practice 
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) concluded, “…lack of participation and accountability 
may be caused not just by exclusion or non-transparent procedures, but also by 
ignorance, information deficits, erroneous beliefs, or collective action dilemmas” (p. 
226). It could be deduced that the latter conditions may foster, or possibly to a lesser 
degree permit, the former conditions. Nevertheless, the focus of this work is to address 
the lack of participation, accountability, and transparency in international accounting 
regulatory processes, which may be due, in part, to ignorance, information deficits, or 
collective action dilemmas.  
Recognition of the structural processes underlying international accounting 
regulation is the first step toward active involvement. As such, the present work creates 
an empirical definition of the organizations which constitute the IASB’s governance 
network and offers additional insights into the composition of this network’s 
membership. Such information provides a valuable backdrop to assess both ongoing and 
historical developments in accounting convergence. Beyond redressing the information 
deficit, or possibly ignorance gap, several avenues for collective action for practical 
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accountants, national governments, political advocates, or social groups can be drawn 
from these conclusions although specific action is not endorsed per se. 
The ability of stakeholder groups to uphold local values, cultures, or social 
interests in the face of global pressure is, at least partly, a function of the group’s ability 
to inform and mobilize collective action (Geyer, 1998). Although the structural forces of 
the IASB’s governance network are clearly organized by powerful financial interest, the 
overall legitimacy of the IASB is based on the premise that it exists as an independent 
body to serve the greater public interest (IASB, 2008b). As demonstrated this global 
financial infrastructure was intentionally and rationally created with theoretical 
implications ranging from serving particular interests to safeguarding and coordinating 
exchanges (Jones et al., 1997; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b; Rowley, 1997). 
Accordingly, underrepresented groups, whether they are geographic, professional, or 
social, have a similar responsibility to inform and mobilize collective action on their own 
behalf or potentially the behalf of others.  
One possible avenue to inform and mobilize collective action is to keep abreast of 
IASB activities. In this respect the IASB has recently amended its due process procedures 
to increase transparency, accessibility, participation, and accountability. For example, 
IASB agenda meetings as well as SAC and IFRIC meetings are open for public 
observation as well as broadcasted and archived on the IASB’s website (IASCF, 2006). 
Moreover, public comments are frequently solicited at various stages in the standard 
setting process (IASCF, 2008d, 2006). In fact, a wealth of organizational information is 
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freely available on the IASB’s website. The IFAC also publishes a vast amount of 
information on its website and allows public participation in meetings. Consequently, the 
IASB and IFAC can be classified as more transparent than the other financial 
organizations in the IASB’s governance network (Loft et al., 2006). 
However, strong limitations to IASB participation remain. For example, the IASB 
has adopted a “comply or explain” (IASCF, 2006, p. 26) policy in which public meetings, 
debates, and comments can be arbitrarily eliminated and replaced by an explanation of 
deviation from due process. In fact, the IASB has revoked due process even in light of 
highly conversational standards. For example, due process was revoked in the recent 
passing of IAS 39 and IFRIC 9 guidance on embedded derivatives in the wake of the 
financial crisis. This frustration is illustrated in a comment received by the FirstRand 
Banking Group (2009), “while we appreciate that the IASB had to react to an unfolding 
crisis we believe that lack of due process can and does impact on the credibility of the 
standards” (p. 1). Furthermore, in cases where local interest conflict with the international 
norms, collective action by these stakeholder groups is less likely to prevail (Caramanis, 
2002; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Loft et al., 2006; Perry & Nolke, 
2005, 2006). 
Recommendations for Related Research 
The potentialities for subsequent research based on these findings are rich. Most 
directly it would be interesting to incorporate these results into a longitutidual 
comparison with an empirical basis. As early as 1983 DiMaggio and Powell advanced 
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several hypotheses to empirically predict organizational structure, process, and behavior 
using longitutidual comparisons. These hypotheses are certainly adaptable to the data 
utilized in the present study. Furthermore, Rowell (1997) and Jones et al. (1997) outlined 
several propositions that could be approached with a longitutidual comparison building 
on this work. 
The rationale for a longitutidual comparison is twofold. First, as Geyer (1998) 
demonstrated historically situated developments can provide a deeper understanding into 
the present situation as well as its future prospects. Second, many social network theories, 
such as Jones et al. (1997), posit conditions in which networks are likely to emerge and 
thrive. As seen here, aspects of the IASB’s governance network have certainly morphed 
in recent years. For example, since Brown’s (2004) study geographic representation has 
increased and ties to the business industry have decreased. Moreover, several powerful 
global organizations, for example, the Mentoring Group and Public Interest Oversight 
Board, have secured dominate positions in international regulatory processes. If we 
assume that the IASB’s governance network is adapting to safeguard and coordinate 
exchanges (Jones et al.), to exert stakeholder influence and constrain organizational 
behavior (Rowley, 1997), or to serve the interest of one stakeholder group at the expense 
of other stakeholder groups (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b), then the longitudinal 
changes in this network can be used to draw particular conclusions.  
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Concluding Statement 
As previously mentioned accounting regulations impact the lives of everyone in 
society. The regulations passed by the IASB are globally binding and inherently capable 
of serving certain stakeholder interest at the expense of other stakeholder groups. Based 
on these assumptions it appears that the structural forces of the IASB will lead it to serve 
the interest of financial markets which are typically aligned with investment, profit, and 
capital generation at the expense of labor and social relations (Brown, 2004). This 
arrangement is likely to benefit investors and financial stakeholders over the interest of 
workers and other social stakeholder groups (Langley, 2004; Perry & Nolke, 2006; 
Waldenburger, 2002). As many rely on personal investment to fund retirement goals this, 
in and of its self, may provide an overall benefit to society. 
On this note it is worth mentioning the emerging status of the average investor. 
As Perry and Nolke (2006) asserted, “…the ultimate owners of shares do not—for the 
most part—actively participate in trading them and allocating their capital. Instead, that 
task falls to investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies and the proprietary 
trading desks of large international banks” (p. 566). Although these intermediaries 
control and benefit from these funds, the investment risk is still assumed by the average 
investor. In this respect it appears that banking controls a large portion of the flow of 
capital as well as maintains a strong structurally embedded influence in the regulation of 
the same capital. Moreover, given these and other issues the actual investor benefit as 
well as the long-term feasibility of this type of retirement funding is questionable 
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(Langley, 2004; Waldenburger, 2002). It would be interesting to study the checks and 
balances of such a system. 
The graphic representations as well as social network measures presented herein 
raise substantial issues with the structural forces driving international accounting 
regulation. Of course, it is nearly impossible to predict with certainty the level of 
influence and/or regulatory actions of the IASB given that it operates in a complex, 
highly political global space. Moreover, the efficacy of accounting convergence, in 
general, is beyond the scope of this work. However, all stakeholder groups should be 
concerned by the existence of structural mechanisms and should consider their impact on 
international accounting standards. Although the IASB has a practical obligation to serve 
the public interest: what is in the public’s interest and how can we be sure such interests 
will be regarded (Baker, 2005)? Perhaps a better way to conceive these issues is that 
powerful global financial organizations are employing structural mechanisms within the 
IASB’s governance network which will likely ensure greater consideration in the 
accounting standard setting process. Consequently, if these interests conflict with labor 
groups, environmental organizations, humanitarian groups, or another such interested 
stakeholders, will they be duly considered by the IASB? Many would say that given the 
current structure and focus of the IASB, most likely not (Caramanis, 2002; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Loft et al., 2006; Perry & Nolke, 2005, 2006). 
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The findings here suggest that the IASB’s governance network is embedded 
within a much larger global financial infrastructure. Furthermore, powerful non-
governmental organizations such as the World Bank and Bank of International 
Settlements are in a position to exert considerable influence over the accounting 
regulators. Of equal concern is the sheer number of professional ties to investment banks, 
which seem to be in a position not only to influence regulation but also to profit from the 
same regulation at the expense of the average investor (Perry & Nolke, 2006). Therefore 
the need for scholars, politicians, average investors, and interest groups to monitor the 
development of international financial reporting standards seems to be of more urgent 
concern than initially thought. 
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FRB Federal Reserve Board 
FSF Financial Stability Forum 
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IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Board 
IAESB International Accounting Educational Standards Board 
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
IASCF International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
IESB International Education Standards Board 
IFAC International Federation of Accountants 
IFIAR International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
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IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
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IDA International Development Association 
IES International Educational Standards 
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SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
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SEC Securities Exchange Commission 
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10/2005-7/2006  DeVry University, Adjunct Accounting Instructor 
♦ Teaching experience includes face-to-face classroom instruction as well as distance education 
learning. 
♦ Taught Introduction to Accounting, Fundamentals of Accounting as well as Managerial and 
Business Accounting. 
 
  
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 
9/2001-1/2003  GS-11 Accountant, Department of Defense Finance & Accounting 
Service 
♦ Provided professional accounting assistance to the organization and to other financial 
managers regarding the accounting functions and the application of accounting principles, 
policies and procedures. 
♦ Ensured the integrity, propriety, accuracy and timeliness of accounting data. 
♦ Identified issues and made recommendations for resolution utilizing Regulations, manuals 
and financial policies. 
 
8/1999-8/2001  Staff Auditor, Indianapolis Public School Corporation   
♦ Responsible for monitoring all internal and external funds within the School Corporation to 
ensure compliance with GAAP as well as Federal and Indiana State Statutes. 
♦ Made oral and written reports to the Director, Superintendent and School Board as necessary 
to carry out all recommendations and to keep them informed on matters affecting financial 
reporting and procedures. 
 
11/1997-8/1999  Staff Accountant, R.W. Armstrong & Associates, Inc. 
♦ Performed full charge accounts payable and payroll in a job cost accounting system. 
♦ Responsible for internal purchasing. 
♦ Filed quarterly payroll and property tax returns. 
♦ Managed internal requisitioning and technical support. 
 
HONORS 
 
Summa Cum Laude 
 
AWARDS 
 
Stanley J. Drazek Teaching Excellence Award, University of Maryland University College (2008 
nominee). 
 
MEMBERSHIPS 
 
American Accounting Association 
International Association for Accounting Education and Research 
 
